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ABSTRACT—The conventional wisdom is that this country’s privately
owned critical infrastructure—banks, telecommunications networks, the
power grid, and so on—is vulnerable to catastrophic cyber-attacks. The
existing academic literature does not adequately grapple with this problem,
however, because it conceives of cyber-security in unduly narrow terms:
most scholars understand cyber-attacks as a problem of either the criminal
law or the law of armed conflict. Cyber-security scholarship need not run in
such established channels. This Article argues that, rather than thinking of
private companies merely as potential victims of cyber-crimes or as
possible targets in cyber-conflicts, we should think of them in
administrative law terms. Many firms that operate critical infrastructure
tend to underinvest in cyber-defense because of problems associated with
negative externalities, positive externalities, free riding, and public goods—
the same sorts of challenges the modern administrative state faces in fields
like environmental law, antitrust law, products liability law, and public
health law. These disciplines do not just yield a richer analytical framework
for thinking about cyber-security; they also expand the range of possible
responses. Understanding the problem in regulatory terms allows us to
adapt various regulatory solutions—such as monitoring and surveillance to
detect malicious code, hardening vulnerable targets, and building resilient
and recoverable systems—for the cyber-security context. In short, an
entirely new conceptual approach to cyber-security is needed.
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INTRODUCTION
The Red Army had been gone for years, but it still had the power to
inspire controversy—and destruction.1 In April 2007, the government of
Estonia announced plans to relocate a contentious Soviet-era memorial in
its capital city of Tallinn. Known as the Bronze Soldier, the Soviets erected
the statue in 1947 to commemorate their sacrifices in the Great Patriotic
War and their “liberation” of their Baltic neighbors. The local population,
which suffered under the Bolshevik boot for decades, understandably saw
the monument in a rather different light. Not long after the announcement,
the tiny nation was hit with a massive cyber-attack. Estonia, sometimes
nicknamed “E-stonia,” is one of the most networked countries in the
world—its citizens bank, vote, and pay taxes online2—and it ground to a
halt for weeks. The country’s largest bank was paralyzed. Credit card
companies took their systems down to keep them from being attacked. The
telephone network went dark. Newspapers and television stations were
knocked offline. Who was responsible for launching what has come to be

1

The events in this paragraph are described in JOEL BRENNER, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: INSIDE
NEW THREAT MATRIX OF DIGITAL ESPIONAGE, CRIME, AND WARFARE 127–30 (2011); RICHARD
A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 11–16 (2010); and Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to
Disable Estonia, GUARDIAN (London), May 17, 2007, at 1.
2
Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using
Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 57, 61 & n.14 (2010).
THE
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known as Web War I?3 The smart money is on Russia, though no one can
say for sure.
It could happen here. Government officials like Richard Clarke, the
former White House cyber-security czar, have been warning of “an
electronic Pearl Harbor” for years.4 Others lament the “gaping
vulnerabilit[ies]”5 in America’s cyber-defenses and speculate that the
economic effect of a major assault could be “an order of magnitude”
greater than the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.6 Academic
commentators generally agree. Some see the danger as “monumental”7 and
the country’s “most pervasive and pernicious threat.”8 Others predict that
America’s failure to secure its cyber-assets “could take down the nation’s
entire security and economic infrastructure”9 and “bring this country to its
knees.”10 It has even been suggested that “[t]he very future of the Republic”
depends on “protect[ing] ourselves from enemies armed with cyber
weapons.”11 There are some naysayers,12 but the consensus that we stand on
the brink of a cyber-calamity is both broad and deep.

3

War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST, July 3–9, 2010, at 25, 28; see also CLARKE & KNAKE,
supra note 1, at 30; David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and Executive Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
795, 799 (2012).
4
Richard Clarke, Threats to U.S. National Security: Proposed Partnership Initiatives Towards
Preventing Cyber Terrorist Attacks, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 33, 38 (1999–2000).
5
Joby Warrick & Walter Pincus, Senate Legislation Would Federalize Cybersecurity; Rules for
Private Networks Also Proposed, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2009, at A4.
6
Max Fisher, Fmr. Intelligence Director: New Cyberattack May Be Worse than 9/11, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 30, 2010, 2:28 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/09/fmr-intelligencedirector-new-ttack-may-be-worse-than-9-11/63849/ (quoting former Director of National Intelligence
Mike McConnell); see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW 1 (2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf
(“Threats to cyberspace pose one of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the
21st Century for the United States and our allies.”).
7
William C. Banks & Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, Introduction, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 7, 11
(2010).
8
Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., The Past, Present, and Future of Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. &
POL’Y 13, 13 (2010); see also CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE
44TH PRESIDENCY 11 (2008), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_
securingcyberspace_44.pdf; Greg Rattray et al., American Security in the Cyber Commons, in
CONTESTED COMMONS: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD 137, 145
(Abraham M. Denmark & James Mulvenon eds., 2010).
9
Opderbeck, supra note 3, at 798.
10
Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1020 n.45 (2001)
(quoting Chris O’Malley, Information Warriors of the 609th, POPULAR SCI., July 1997, at 71, 72).
11
Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 155, 156 (2010).
12
See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 604 (2011); Charles J.
Dunlap, Jr., Meeting the Challenge of Cyberterrorism: Defining the Military Role in a Democracy,
76 INT’L L. STUD. 353, 361 (2002); Seymour M. Hersh, The Online Threat, NEW YORKER, Nov. 1,
2010, at 44, 48; Martin Libicki, Rethinking War: The Mouse’s New Roar?, FOREIGN POL’Y, Winter
1999–2000, at 30, 38; Jerry Brito & Tate Watkins, Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat
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A large-scale cyber-attack on this country, as in Estonia, likely would
target privately held critical infrastructure—banks, telecommunications
carriers, power companies, and other firms whose compromise would cause
widespread harm.13 Indeed, America’s critical infrastructure, approximately
85% of which is owned by private firms,14 already faces constant
intrusions.15 Yet the private sector’s defenses are widely regarded as
inadequate. Companies are essentially on their own when it comes to
protecting their computer systems, with the government neither imposing
security requirements nor bearing a share of the resulting costs.16 According
to Bruce Smith, the United States follows a “bifurcated approach to
network security” that “relie[s] predominantly on private investment in
prevention and public investment in prosecution.”17 Christopher Coyne and
Peter Leeson likewise stress that our defensive strategy “is simply the sum
of dispersed decisions of individual users and businesses.”18 Regular firms
that operate in competitive markets (such as online retailers) may be
Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy 6–7 (Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 11-24,
2011), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/WP1124_Loving_cyber-_bomb.pdf.
13
See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 1, at xiii; Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International
Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 179,
182 (2006). Federal law defines “critical infrastructure” as “systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or
any combination of those matters.” 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2006). Some types of critical infrastructure
are more important, and less likely to be adequately defended, than others.
14
Todd A. Brown, Legal Propriety of Protecting Defense Industrial Base Information
Infrastructure, 64 A.F. L. REV. 211, 220 (2009); Gus P. Coldebella & Brian M. White, Foundational
Questions Regarding the Federal Role in Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 233, 240 (2010);
Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, Who’s to Protect Cyberspace?, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 473,
476 (2005); Gregory T. Nojeim, Cybersecurity and Freedom on the Internet, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. &
POL’Y 119, 135 (2010); Benjamin Powell, Is Cybersecurity a Public Good? Evidence from the
Financial Services Industry, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 497, 497 (2005); Paul Rosenzweig, Cybersecurity
and Public Goods: The Public/Private “Partnership,” HOOVER INST. 2 (2011), http://media.hoover.org
/sites/default/files/documents/EmergingThreats_Rosenzweig.pdf, reprinted in PAUL ROSENZWEIG,
CYBERWARFARE: HOW CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE ARE CHALLENGING AMERICA AND CHANGING THE
WORLD 156–75 (2012).
15
See MCAFEE & CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, IN THE DARK: CRUCIAL INDUSTRIES
CONFRONT CYBERATTACKS 6 (2011), available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rpcritical-infrastructure-protection.pdf; Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the
Effects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1537 (2010); Neal Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as
Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261, 2263 (2003); Debra Wong Yang & Brian M. Hoffstadt,
Countering the Cyber-Crime Threat, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 201, 205 (2006).
16
See Yasuhide Yamada et al., A Comparative Study of the Information Security Policies of Japan
and the United States, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 217, 219–20 (2010).
17
Bruce P. Smith, Hacking, Poaching, and Counterattacking: Digital Counterstrikes and the
Contours of Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 171, 173 (2005).
18
Coyne & Leeson, supra note 14, at 475–76; accord AM. BAR ASS’N, NATIONAL SECURITY
THREATS IN CYBERSPACE 8 (2009), available at http://nationalstrategy.com/Portals/0/National%
20Security%20Threats%20in%20Cyberspace%20%20FINAL%2009-15-09.pdf; Banks & Parker, supra
note 7; Nojeim, supra note 14, at 121.
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adequately protecting their systems against ordinary intruders (such as
recreational hackers). But strategically significant firms in uncompetitive
markets (such as power companies and other public utilities) seem less
likely to maintain defenses capable of protecting their systems against
skilled and determined adversaries (such as foreign intelligence services).
The poor state of America’s cyber-defenses is partly due to the fact
that the analytical framework used to understand the problem is
incomplete. The law and policy of cyber-security are undertheorized.
Virtually all legal scholarship approaches cyber-security from the
standpoint of the criminal law or the law of armed conflict.19 Given these
analytical commitments, it is inevitable that academics and lawmakers will
tend to favor law enforcement and military solutions to cyber-security
problems. These are important perspectives, but cyber-security scholarship
need not run in such narrow channels. An entirely new approach is needed.
Rather than conceiving of private firms merely as possible victims of
cyber-crimes, or as potential targets in cyber-conflicts, we should think of
them in regulatory terms.20 Many companies that operate critical
infrastructure tend to underinvest in cyber-defense because of negative
externalities, positive externalities, free riding, and public goods
19

Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 12, at 588–89. For examples of the criminal law approach,
see Banks & Parker, supra note 7, at 9; Mary M. Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don’t
They? An Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171, 190–97 (2000);
Sean M. Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace,
20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 407–08 (2007); Katyal, Criminal Law, supra note 10, at 1013–38; Katyal,
Digital Architecture, supra note 15, at 2263–88; Michael Edmund O’Neill, Old Crimes in New Bottles:
Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 241–52 (2000); Opderbeck, supra note 3, at 822–
26; and Yang & Hoffstadt, supra note 15, at 201–07. For examples of the armed conflict approach, see
Brown, supra note 13, at 182–90; Condron, supra, at 408; David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the
Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 87, 90–100 (2010); Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on
Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 207, 214–29 (2002); Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT’L
SEC. L. & POL’Y 63, 70–82 (2010); William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s
Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 101–05 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack
and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 900–24 (1999); Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to
Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to
Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 6–10 (2009); and Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of
Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 426–37 (2011). There are
exceptions. Some scholars understand cyber-security in public health terms. See IBM, MEETING THE
CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGE: EMPOWERING STAKEHOLDERS AND ENSURING COORDINATION 11–14
(2010), available at http://www-304.ibm.com/easyaccess3/fileserve?contentid=192188; Jeffrey Hunker,
U.S. International Policy for Cybersecurity: Five Issues that Won’t Go Away, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. &
POL’Y 197, 202–04 (2010); Deirdre K. Mulligan & Fred B. Schneider, Doctrine for Cybersecurity,
140 DAEDALUS 70, 77–88 (2011); Rattray et al., supra note 8, at 151–66. Others approach cybersecurity from an economic perspective. See THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY (Mark F.
Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2006); Coyne & Leeson, supra note 14, at 473–77; Powell, supra note
14, at 498–501; Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 7–11.
20
Cf. Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575 (2010) (proposing an
administrative law framework for understanding domestic intelligence).
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problems—the same sorts of challenges the modern administrative state
encounters in a variety of other contexts.
For instance, cyber-security resembles environmental law in that both
fields are primarily concerned with negative externalities. Just as firms tend
to underinvest in pollution controls because some costs of their emissions
are borne by those who are downwind, they also tend to underinvest in
cyber-defenses because some costs of intrusions are externalized onto
others. An attack on a power plant will not harm just the intended target; it
will also harm the company’s customers and those with whom the company
has no relationship. Because firms do not bear the full costs of their
vulnerabilities, they have weaker incentives to secure their systems. Cybersecurity also resembles an antitrust problem. Antitrust law seeks to prevent
anticompetitive behavior, and it traditionally has been skeptical of
coordination among competitors. Some interfirm cooperation could
improve cyber-security—sharing information about vulnerabilities and
threats, for example, or developing industry-wide security standards. Yet
firms are reluctant to do so because they fear antitrust liability. Cybersecurity raises tort problems as well. Products liability law uses the threat
of money damages to incentivize firms to take reasonable precautions when
designing their products, but this threat is almost entirely absent in the
cyber-security context. Companies face little risk of liability to those who
are harmed by attacks on their systems or products, and they therefore have
weaker incentives to identify and patch vulnerabilities. Finally, cybersecurity resembles public health. A key goal of public health law is
prevention—keeping those who have contracted a disease from spreading it
to the healthy, a form of negative externality. Public health law uses
vaccinations to promote immunity, biosurveillance to detect outbreaks, and
quarantines to contain infectious diseases. Cyber-security has similar
goals—ensuring that critical systems are immune to malware, quickly
detecting outbreaks of malicious code, and preventing contaminated
computers from infecting clean systems—and could use similar tools.
Approaching cyber-security from a regulatory vantage point does not
just yield a richer analytical framework. It also expands the range of
possible responses. If cyber-insecurity resembles problems that arise in
other regulatory contexts, then perhaps some of their solutions can be
adapted here; the more frameworks available, the longer the menu of policy
choices. Taken together, these disciplines suggest four groups of responses:
(1) monitoring and surveillance to detect malicious code, (2) hardening
vulnerable targets and enabling them to defeat intrusions, (3) building
resilient systems that can function during attacks and recover quickly, and
(4) responding in the aftermath of attacks.
First, public health law’s distributed biosurveillance network might be
used as a model for detecting cyber-intrusions. Rather than empowering a
single regulator to monitor Internet traffic for outbreaks of malicious code,
private firms could be tasked with reporting information about the
1508
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vulnerabilities and threats they experience in the same way hospitals report
to public health authorities. To incentivize participation in this distributed
surveillance network, firms might be offered various subsidies (on the
theory that cyber-security data is a public good that the market will tend to
underproduce) and liability protections (such as an exemption from the
antitrust laws). Second, we might harden targets by adopting industry-wide
security standards for companies that operate critical infrastructure. These
protocols should not be issued in the form of traditional regulatory
commands. Instead, as is sometimes the case in environmental law and
other fields, the private sector should actively participate in formulating the
standards. Tort law has a role to play as well: threats of liability and offers
of immunity might be used to incentivize firms to implement the protocols.
Third, because it is inevitable that some cyber-attacks will succeed, it is
important that critical systems are able to survive and recover. Public
health law offers several strategies for improving resilience. Systems that
are infected with malware might be temporarily isolated to prevent them
from spreading the contagion. Or firms might build excess capacity into
their systems that can be deployed in emergencies—the equivalent of
stockpiling vaccines and medicines. Finally, although retaliation is
thoroughly addressed in the existing criminal law and armed conflict
literatures, there is one possible response that deserves brief mention here:
“hackbacks,” in which a victim counterattacks the attacker. Because the
counterattack might fall on a third party whose system has been conscripted
by the intruder, hackbacks can incentivize those third parties to prevent
their systems from being so commandeered. Hackbacks also might weaken
attackers’ incentives: if assailants know that counterattacks can render their
intrusions ineffective, they are less likely to commit them in the first place.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I considers whether private
companies are investing socially optimal amounts in cyber-defenses. Part II
describes four regulatory frameworks—environmental law, antitrust law,
products liability law, and public health law—and explains their relevance
to cyber-security. Part III surveys solutions used by these regulatory
disciplines and considers how to adapt them for the cyber-security context.
Several preliminary observations are needed. First, I use the terms
“cyber-attack” and “cyber-intrusion” interchangeably to denote any effort
by an unauthorized user to affect the data on, or to take control of, a
computer system. As used here, the terms include all of the following:
“viruses” (a piece of code that “infects a software program and then
ensures that the infected program reproduces the virus”21); “worms” (“a
stand-alone program that replicates itself”22); “logic bombs” (malware that
21

O’Neill, supra note 19, at 246; accord Katyal, Criminal Law, supra note 10, at 1023; Sklerov,
supra note 19, at 14–15.
22
Katyal, Criminal Law, supra note 10, at 1024; accord Sklerov, supra note 19, at 15. Viruses and
worms are similar. A principal difference is that viruses require human action to propagate—such as
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“tells a computer to execute a set of instructions at a certain time or under
certain specified conditions”23); and distributed denial-of-service (DDOS)
attacks (in which a “master” computer conscripts “zombies” and orders
them to disable a victim by flooding it with traffic24). Second, this Article
emphatically is not a paean to traditional command-and-control regulation.
The conventional wisdom is to avoid cyber-security regulation,25 in part
because of doubts about the government’s ability to manage such a
dynamic field. But, as I hope to show in the following pages, cyber-security
need not, and in many cases should not, be pursued with heavy-handed
regulatory tools. It is possible to promote better cyber-defenses with private
law, such as by modifying traditional tort law doctrines. As for public law,
regulation need not take the form of rigid legal commands backed by the
threat of sanction; regulatory objectives often can be attained by appealing
to private firms’ self-interest—by offering positive incentives to improve
their defenses, not just by punishing them when they fall short. The private
sector’s poor defenses may represent a market failure, as some have
argued,26 but “[t]here’s not much point in replacing a predictable market
failure with an equally predictable government failure.”27
I. AN EFFICIENT LEVEL OF CYBER-SECURITY
Our national security depends on the security of our critical
infrastructure.28 A cyber-attack on these assets, most of which are held by
private firms, could be devastating: with a few keystrokes, adversaries
could hack into banks and corrupt customer data, take control of power
plants and bring down the electricity grid, open the floodgates of dams, and
take telecommunications networks offline.29 Or worse. Despite the
magnitude of the threat, the conventional wisdom is that the private sector
is not adequately protecting itself.30 This section surveys the available
clicking on a link or opening an attachment—but worms replicate on their own. CLARKE & KNAKE,
supra note 1, at 81; Katyal, Criminal Law, supra note 10, at 1024; O’Neill, supra note 19, at 247.
23
Katyal, Criminal Law, supra note 10, at 1025; accord O’Neill, supra note 19, at 248.
24
STEWART A. BAKER, SKATING ON STILTS: WHY WE AREN’T STOPPING TOMORROW’S
TERRORISM 202–03 (2010); BRENNER, supra note 1, at 38–39; CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 1, at 13–
14; Lin, supra note 19, at 70.
25
See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 1, at 108–09; see also Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the
Network, 164 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2232471 (“[C]ybersecurity is underregulated.”).
26
See BAKER, supra note 24, at 237; CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, supra note 8, at 50;
Katyal, Digital Architecture, supra note 15, at 2285.
27
BAKER, supra note 24, at 237; accord Coyne & Leeson, supra note 14, at 490; Powell, supra
note 14, at 507.
28
See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 18, at 6–8; BRENNER, supra note 1, at 223.
29
See BRENNER, supra note 1, at 137–54; CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 1, at 64–68; Stewart
Baker, Denial of Service, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/
2011/09/30/denial_of_service?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full.
30
See infra notes 34–41 and accompanying text.
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evidence on the extent of private cyber-security expenditures. It then
predicts that ordinary firms in competitive markets (like online retailers)
are more likely to be investing socially optimal amounts in cyber-defense,
while strategically significant firms in uncompetitive markets (like public
utilities) are more likely to be underinvesting.
The optimal level of cyber-intrusions is not zero, and the optimal level
of cyber-security expenditures is not infinity. From an economic
perspective, the goal is to achieve an efficient level of attacks, not to
prevent all attacks.31 Suppose that the expected cost to society of a given
cyber-attack—its cost discounted by the probability that it will occur—is
$5 billion. It would be efficient for society to invest up to $5 billion in
countermeasures to prevent the attack. If the necessary countermeasures
cost more than $5 billion, the cost of preventing the attack would exceed
the resulting security gains.32 Relatedly, some intrusions are more
problematic than others. Cyber-security is a form of risk management,
where risk is a function of three variables: vulnerabilities, threats, and
consequences.33 A company with easily hacked systems, that faces a high
probability of attacks from sophisticated foreign intelligence services, and
whose compromise would cause severe social harm raises very different
problems than a company with relatively robust defenses, that is unlikely to
face skilled intruders, and whose compromise would have few
consequences for society.
Are individual firms, and society as a whole, investing the right
amount in cyber-defense? Most observers believe that firms are
underinvesting—and are missing the mark by a wide margin. Richard
Clarke proclaims the private sector response an “unmitigated failure,”34 and
scholars generally agree.35 Very little empirical data is available, but the
consensus view has at least some anecdotal support. Studies conducted in
31

Coyne & Leeson, supra note 14, at 477–78.
Id. at 478.
33
See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 7.
34
CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 1, at 104.
35
See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 18, at 9; Banks & Parker, supra note 7, at 9; Katyal, Criminal
Law, supra note 10, at 1019; Bruce Schneier, Computer Security: It’s the Economics, Stupid (May 16,
2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/resources/affiliates/
workshops/econsecurity/. But see Coldebella & White, supra note 14; Smith, supra note 17, at 173
n.12. Some scholars argue that companies are providing a suboptimally high level of cyber-security.
Benjamin Powell reports that a 2000 study found that firms would invest in cyber-defenses if they were
expected to produce a 20% return on investment, which was considerably lower than the 30% return on
investment typically required for information technology investments. Powell, supra note 14, at 504.
What mechanism could account for a tendency to overinvest? A firm’s IT department has incentives to
overstate the vulnerabilities the company faces, as cyber-security fears translate into a larger share of
the company’s budget; for outside security vendors, such fears mean brisker business. Bambauer,
Conundrum, supra note 12, at 604–06; Calkins, supra note 19, at 198–99; Ross Anderson, Unsettling
Parallels Between Security and the Environment (May 16, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/resources/affiliates/workshops/econsecurity/.
32
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2009 and 2011 by McAfee, a computer security firm, revealed low levels
of investment in cyber-defense. The studies found that many firms regard
cyber-security as little more than “a last box they have to check,”36 and that
they neglect network security because they find it too expensive.37 In
particular, McAfee found that companies often have weak authentication
requirements38—tools that can verify that the person who is accessing a
system is who he says he is, and is authorized to access the system. Even
fewer have systems that can monitor network activity and identify
anomalies.39 Other studies reveal that some companies’ defenses are so
poor they don’t even know when they’ve suffered an attack. Verizon
reported that “fully 75 percent of the intrusions they investigated were
discovered by people other than the victims and 66 percent of victims did
not even know an intrusion occurred on the system.”40 Finally, a 2011 study
by the Ponemon Institute found “that 73 percent of companies surveyed
had been hacked, but 88 percent of them spent more money on coffee than
on securing their Web applications.”41
Are these levels of investment efficient? Whether a particular firm is
making socially optimal investments in cyber-security—and the related
issue of who should pay for that company’s cyber-defenses—is a function
of two intersecting questions. First, what is the defending firm? Is it a
regular company in a competitive market, an operator of critical
infrastructure in an uncompetitive market, or something in between?
Second, who is the anticipated attacker? Is it a recreational hacker, a
foreign intelligence service, or someone in between?

36

MCAFEE & CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, supra note 15, at 1.
MCAFEE, IN THE CROSSFIRE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR 14
(2009), available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-in-crossfire-critical-infrastructurecyber-war.pdf.
38
See MCAFEE & CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, supra note 15, at 14.
39
Id. at 15. It would be a mistake to read too much into these findings. The study’s methodology
was to survey business executives in about a dozen countries, MCAFEE, supra note 37, at 1, 41 n.1;
MCAFEE & CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, supra note 15, at 3, and it “was not designed to be a
statistically valid opinion poll with sampling and error margins.” MCAFEE, supra note 37, at 1.
Moreover, a computer security company obviously stands to benefit from public perceptions that
security is lacking.
40
Rattray et al., supra note 8, at 155; accord Jensen, Cyber Warfare, supra note 15, at 1536.
41
BRENNER, supra note 1, at 239.
37
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The range of possibilities can be depicted in a simple graph:

The x-axis depicts the firms that might be subject to a cyber-attack.
They are arranged from left to right in order of increasing strategic
significance. A strategically significant company is one whose compromise
would result in substantial social harms. On the far left are relatively
insignificant firms in competitive markets—markets in which many
companies offer the same good or service, and where disappointed
consumers therefore may defect from one to another. An example would be
online retailers, such as Amazon.com. To the right are financial
institutions, which rate high on the strategic significance scale. Former
Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell predicted that an attack
on a single bank “would have an order-of-magnitude greater impact on the
global economy” than 9/11.42 Banks operate in fairly competitive markets,
as consumers can easily move their accounts from one to another. Another
step to the right are Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and
telecommunications carriers. They, too, are strategically significant. When
Russia crippled Georgia’s communications systems during their 2008 war,
citizens “could not connect to any outside news or information sources and
42

David E. Sanger et al., U.S. Plans Attack and Defense in Web Warfare, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2009, at A1 (quoting former Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell); accord Sklerov, supra
note 19, at 19–20.
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could not send e-mail out of the country.”43 These markets are less
competitive; consumers typically have only a handful of Internet providers
or telephone companies to choose from. At the far right are power
companies and other public utilities. These firms rate high on the strategic
significance scale. A cyber-attack on the power grid would be truly
catastrophic. The industrial control, or SCADA,44 systems used by power
plants and other utilities are increasingly connected to the Internet.45
Hackers could exploit this connectivity to disrupt power generation and
leave tens of millions of people in the dark for months.46 They could even
destroy key system components like turbines.47 In 2009, the Stuxnet
worm—“the most sophisticated cyberweapon ever deployed”48—caused
similar physical damage to Iran’s nuclear program.49 Utility markets are
uncompetitive. Municipalities typically have only one power company or
natural gas supplier, and there is no meaningful prospect that disappointed
consumers will switch to a competitor.
The y-axis depicts the assailants that might commit a cyber-attack.
They are arranged from bottom to top in order of increasing sophistication.
A sophisticated attacker is capable of compromising the most secure
systems; unsophisticated attackers are only able to compromise relatively
unsecured systems. At the bottom are recreational hackers—intruders out
for “a digital joy ride.”50 One step above are “hacktivists.” Hacktivists are
relatively skilled hackers who use cyber-intrusions to advance a political

43

CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 1, at 19; see also BRENNER, supra note 1, at 39–40; Jensen, Cyber
Warfare, supra note 15, at 1540.
44
The acronym stands for “supervisory control and data acquisition.” CTR. FOR STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUDIES, supra note 8, at 54; CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 1, at 98; Randal C. Picker,
Cybersecurity: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY, supra
note 19, at 115, 126.
45
See BRENNER, supra note 1, at 97; CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, supra note 8, at 54;
Steven R. Chabinsky, Cybersecurity Strategy, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 27, 27 n.1 (2010); Condron,
supra note 19, at 407; Coyne & Leeson, supra note 14, at 474; Sklerov, supra note 19, at 18.
46
See BRENNER, supra note 1, at 105; CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 1, at 99; Sean Watts,
Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 391, 404–05 (2010); Ellen
Nakashima & Steven Mufson, Hackers Have Attacked Foreign Utilities, CIA Analyst Says, WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 2008, at A4.
47
See BRENNER, supra note 1, at 110; CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 1, at 100; Gable, supra note
2, at 59–60; ECONOMIST, supra note 3, at 28.
48
William J. Broad et al., Israel Tests Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2011, at A1; accord BRENNER, supra note 1, at 102; Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Systems Are Vulnerable
to Hackers, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2011, at A3; Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet,
the Most Menacing Malware in History, WIRED (July 11, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/all/.
49
BRENNER, supra note 1, at 103; Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 12, at 585–86; John
Markoff, A Silent Attack, but Not a Subtle One, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A6.
50
Dunlap, supra note 12, at 358.
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agenda; they typically do not group themselves into formal organizations.51
An example is “Anonymous,” a loose association that in late 2010
launched DDOS attacks on financial institutions that refused to let
customers send money to WikiLeaks, an antisecrecy group that had
published a number of classified documents.52 Next are organized crime
syndicates, such as those operating out of Russia.53 They, too, are fairly
sophisticated. They engage in cyber-intrusions primarily for financial gain
and by definition they are structured organizations.54 International terrorists
might be placed here as well, though they have shown little enthusiasm or
aptitude for cyber-attacks thus far.55 However, al Qaeda reportedly
established “an academy of cyber-terrorism” in Afghanistan,56 and
computers taken from members contained information about SCADA
systems in the United States.57 At the top are foreign governments’
militaries and intelligence services. These are the most sophisticated
adversaries of all, and they are capable of breaking into even highly secure
systems. Internet giant Google recently saw its Gmail service penetrated by
Chinese spies who wanted to eavesdrop on the Dalai Lama.58 Similarly,
RSA—a software firm that issues online security credentials for the
Pentagon, defense contractors, and other sensitive enterprises—was
compromised so badly (probably by China) that it had to offer new
credentials to all its customers.59
The curve roughly predicts the combinations of victims and attackers
that are likely to occur. Quadrant (4) involves high-frequency, low-severity
attacks. Retailers and other relatively insignificant firms will be targeted
fairly often by comparatively unsophisticated recreational hackers and,
perhaps, by more sophisticated hacktivists who disapprove of their
corporate policies. (The Anonymous attacks on banks are a good example.)
Quadrant (2) involves attacks that are low-frequency and high-severity.
More strategically significant firms like ISPs and public utilities will face
attacks from sophisticated militaries and intelligence services, and perhaps
51

See Byron Acohido, Hacktivists Will Be Busy This Year, Experts Warn, USA TODAY, Jan. 11,
2012, at 1B.
52
Somini Sengupta, 16 People Arrested in Wave of Attacks on Web Sites, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2011, at B2.
53
Brian Krebs, Shadowy Russian Firm Seen as Conduit for Cybercrime, WASH. POST, Oct. 13,
2007, at A15.
54
See BRENNER, supra note 1, at 7–8, 25.
55
Condron, supra note 19, at 405; Dunlap, supra note 12, at 359–60.
56
Joel P. Trachtman, Global Cyberterrorism, Jurisdiction, and International Organization, in THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY, supra note 19, at 259, 259–60.
57
BRENNER, supra note 1, at 106.
58
See BAKER, supra note 24, at 208–13; BRENNER, supra note 1, at 46–47; Bambauer, Ghost,
supra note 25, at 2–3; Ellen Nakashima, Google to Enlist NSA to Ward Off Attacks, WASH. POST, Feb.
4, 2010, at A1; Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 6.
59
Baker, supra note 29, at 2–3.
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from organized crime syndicates seeking to extract blackmail payments.
These attacks will occur rarely, but they are likely to be devastating. In
quadrant (3), recreational hackers and hacktivists might launch attacks
against utilities and similarly significant enterprises, but these targets are
probably less attractive to them than they are to foreign militaries or
intelligence services.60 In quadrant (1), foreign governments are unlikely to
target insignificant firms like retailers, because they gain little by
compromising them, though organized crime may do so (again, for
blackmail purposes).
We are now in a position to make predictions about various
companies’ cyber-security expenditures. The closer we are on the curve to
the lower left corner, the higher the probability that the firm is investing a
socially optimal amount in cyber-defense. This is so in part because the
expected social cost of an attack on an ordinary company is fairly low.
Society will not grind to a halt if Amazon.com is knocked offline;
bookworms might experience minor annoyance but they will still be able to
buy a copy of Gilead from Barnes & Noble. In addition, these companies
are unlikely to face attacks by skilled and determined foreign governments,
so it is not necessary for them to spend huge sums of money on the very
best and most impregnable defenses. The efficient level of cyber-security
investment for them thus is fairly low. Importantly, market forces may
provide these firms with meaningful incentives to protect their systems
against cyber-attacks. Retailers, banks, and similar companies operate in
competitive markets. The risk of customer exit provides them with strong
incentives to cater to customer demand. If consumers want the companies
with which they do business to provide better security against cyberattacks—the jury is out on that question, incidentally61—they will have
good reason do so.62
60

Zetter, supra note 48 (“[C]ontrol systems aren’t a traditional hacker target, because there’s no
obvious financial gain in hacking them . . . .”).
61
Compare BRENNER, supra note 1, at 225–26 (“[S]oftware consumers buy on price, and they
haven’t been willing to pay for more secure software.”), and Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger,
Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 946–47 (2007) (noting that consumers
often lack direct relationships with the entities to which retailers outsource data processing and which
are often the targets of intrusions), with Dunlap, supra note 12 (arguing that the growth in online retail
will incentivize companies to invest in reliable computer security technology), and Doug Lichtman &
Eric P. Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
CYBERSECURITY, supra note 19, at 221, 256 (“[W]orms and viruses . . . impose[] a cost on the average
user and thus reduce[] the incentive to subscribe.”).
62
Note that current liability rules both diminish and augment these incentives. The Federal Wiretap
Act makes it a crime to intercept electronic communications, and some ISPs fear that this prohibition
prevents them from filtering botnet traffic or other malware; the threat of liability undermines their
incentives to improve the security of their systems. See infra notes 201–08 and accompanying text. By
contrast, the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act requires banks, on pain of significant money damages, to
protect customer data against unauthorized access; the threat of liability amplifies their incentives to
improve the security of their systems. See infra notes 209–17 and accompanying text.
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The closer we are on the curve to the upper right corner—lowfrequency, high-severity cyber-attacks—the lower the probability that the
firm is adequately investing in cyber-security. First, the expected social
cost of such an intrusion is monumental. The consequences of an attack on,
say, the power grid would reverberate throughout the economy, causing
harm to the utility, its customers, and countless third parties. Because the
expected cost of an attack on these firms is so high, it is efficient to invest
greater sums in securing them against intruders. In addition, the modest,
low-cost defenses that are usually capable of thwarting recreational hackers
will do nothing to prevent intrusions by foreign governments; more
expensive countermeasures are needed to protect against these
exceptionally sophisticated adversaries. The socially optimal level of
cyber-security investment for these firms is thus fairly high.
Second, power companies and other utilities are not subject to market
forces that might incentivize them to improve their cyber-defenses. Utilities
face little if any competition; a given customer typically will be served by
only one power company. Customer exit is essentially impossible, and the
utility therefore has weaker incentives to supply what its customers
demand. This absence of beneficial market forces may help explain why
public utilities often fail to implement even relatively costless security
measures.63 Many electric companies use vendor default passwords to
protect their SCADA systems,64 and a recent study found that they take an
average of 331 days to implement security patches for these systems.65
Perhaps not coincidentally, hackers—most likely Chinese and Russian
spies—have been able to insert logic bombs into the power grid.66
If this analysis is correct, then strategically significant firms in
uncompetitive markets are less likely to adequately invest in cyber-security
than ordinary firms in competitive markets. The question then becomes
who should be responsible for securing these most sensitive companies
against the most dangerous adversaries. Economists often argue that risk
should be allocated to the low cost avoider.67 If the government can reduce
a vulnerability more efficiently than a firm, it should pay; if the firm can
reduce the vulnerability more efficiently, it should pay. But there is no
single low cost avoider in this context. Defending critical infrastructure
63

Availability bias is another reason why firms might tend to underinvest in cyber-defense. See
generally Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683 (1999) (describing availability bias). The United States has not experienced a major cyberincident that has captured the public’s imagination, so firms might irrationally discount the probability
that they will suffer a catastrophic attack. See MCAFEE, supra note 37; John Grant, Will There Be
Cybersecurity Legislation?, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 103, 111 (2010).
64
MCAFEE & CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, supra note 15, at 8.
65
BRENNER, supra note 1, at 98.
66
Siobhan Gorman, Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated by Spies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2009, at A1.
67
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 169–70 (2006); Katyal, Criminal Law, supra note
10, at 1095–96.
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against sophisticated cyber-attackers is a task that features dueling
comparative advantages. Private firms typically know more than outsiders,
including the government, about the architecture of their systems, so they
often are in a better position to know about weaknesses that intruders might
exploit.68 The private sector thus has a comparative advantage at identifying
cyber-vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the government’s highly skilled
intelligence agencies typically know more than the private sector about
malware used by foreign governments and how to defeat it.69 The
government thus has a comparative advantage at detecting sophisticated
attacks and developing countermeasures. This suggests that responsibility
for defending the most sensitive systems against the most sophisticated
adversaries should be shared.
What might such a partnership look like? All private firms might be
asked to provide a baseline level of cyber-security—modestly effective
(and modestly expensive) defenses that are capable of thwarting intrusions
by adversaries of low to medium sophistication. The government would
then assume responsibility for defending public utilities and other sensitive
enterprises against catastrophic attacks by foreign militaries and other
highly sophisticated adversaries.70 This division of labor—basic security
provided by firms, supplemental security provided by the government—is
in a sense the opposite of what we see in realspace criminal law. In
realspace, the government offers all citizens a baseline level of protection
against criminals in the form of police officers, prosecutors, and courts.
Individuals may supplement these protections at their own expense, such as
by installing alarm systems in their homes or hiring private security
guards.71 This arrangement also is consistent with our intuitions about the
respective roles of government and the private sector in times of conflict.72
Consider another realspace analogy: in World War II, factories were not
expected to install anti-aircraft batteries to defend themselves against
Luftwaffe bombers.73 Nor should we expect power plants to defend
themselves against foreign governments’ cyber-attacks. Protecting vital
national assets from destruction by foreign militaries is a quintessential,
perhaps the quintessential, government function.74
The division of labor I suggest also seems sound from an economic
standpoint. If a firm invested in extraordinarily expensive cyber-defenses
68

See infra notes 272–75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 276–78 and accompanying text.
70
See Trachtman, supra note 56, at 272; Jeremy A. Rabkin & Ariel Rabkin, To Confront Cyber
Threats, We Must Rethink the Law of Armed Conflict, HOOVER INST. 4 (2012), http://media.hoover.org/
sites/default/files/documents/EmergingThreats_Rabkin.pdf.
71
See Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 20.
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See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 1, at 144.
73
Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 25.
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BRENNER, supra note 1, at 223; CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, supra note 8, at 15; see
Katyal, Digital Architecture, supra note 15, at 2282.
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capable of thwarting doomsday attacks by foreign intelligence services, it
would effectively be subsidizing the rest of the population. The company
would capture some benefits of increased security, but a large portion of
the benefits would be in the form of a positive externality conferred on
others.75 In other words, the firm would be providing a public good, a good
that is both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.76 Economic theory predicts
that public goods will be underprovided on the market;77 a standard
response is to subsidize their production.78 Here, the government might
provide a sensitive enterprise with a subsidy equal in value to its costs of
defending against the most sophisticated cyber-attackers.79 This subsidy
could take many forms. The government could either pay for the firm’s
defenses directly or reimburse it for its cyber-security expenditures. Or the
company could be offered various tax credits, deductions, and other
benefits. Or it could be granted immunity from certain forms of legal
liability. (In that case, the subsidy would not run from society as a whole,
but from those who were injured by the firm’s otherwise unlawful conduct
and whose entitlement to redress had been extinguished. This sort of
subsidy is potentially regressive.) Or the government might provide the
company with intelligence about the types of attacks it may face. This sort
of subsidy appears to be occurring already: the National Security Agency
(NSA) reportedly is providing malware signature files to Google and
certain banks to help them detect sophisticated intrusions into their
systems.80
In short, private companies—especially firms that operate critical
infrastructure in uncompetitive markets—may not be adequately investing
in defenses against the most devastating forms of cyber-attacks. The next
section explores several regulatory models that might be consulted when
devising an appropriate response.
II. CYBER-SECURITY FRAMEWORKS, CONVENTIONAL AND
UNCONVENTIONAL
Cyberspace is beset by externalities.81 An externality is “an effect on
the market the source of which is external to the market”;82 it occurs when
75

Supriya Sarnikar & D. Bruce Johnsen, Cyber Security in the National Market System,
6 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 1, 16–17 (2009).
76
See infra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
77
See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
78
See, e.g., Nojeim, supra note 14, at 128.
79
Amitai Aviram, Network Responses to Network Threats, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
CYBERSECURITY, supra note 19, at 143, 149, 156; Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 12, at 658;
Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 25.
80
See infra notes 277–78 and accompanying text.
81
See Picker, supra note 44, at 115.
82
Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 553, 563 (1999).
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an actor’s conduct results in the imposition of a cost or benefit on a
nonconsenting third party. Externalities can be either positive or negative.
“Positive externalities occur whenever an activity generates benefits that
the actor is unable to internalize,” such as through prices; “[n]egative
externalities occur when one’s activity imposes costs on others” that
likewise are not transmitted through prices.83 Economic theory predicts that
the market will oversupply negative externalities relative to socially
optimal levels “because the producer will internalize all benefits of the
activity but not all of the costs.”84 It also predicts that the market will
undersupply positive externalities because third parties will free ride.85
Externalities thus represent a form of market failure.86 The standard
government response to a negative externality is to discourage the
responsible conduct (e.g., with taxation or regulation); the standard
response to a positive externality is to encourage the responsible conduct
(e.g., with a subsidy).87
Cyber-security can be understood in these terms. If a company suffers
an intrusion, much of the harm will fall on third parties; the attack results in
a negative externality.88 It can be extraordinarily difficult to internalize
these costs. The class of persons affected by the intrusion will often be so
large that it would be prohibitively expensive to use market exchanges to
internalize the resulting externalities; the transaction costs are simply too
great. Nor can tort law internalize the costs, as firms generally do not face
liability for harms that result from cyber-attacks on their systems or
products.89 Because many companies do not bear these costs, they ignore
them when deciding how much to spend on cyber-defense and therefore
tend to underinvest relative to socially optimal levels. (This is true both of
companies that produce computer products, such as software
manufacturers, and companies that use them, such as ISPs and utility
companies.) Cyber-security also involves positive externalities.90 A
company that secures itself against intruders makes it harder for assailants
to commandeer its systems to attack others. Investments in cyber-defense
thus effectively subsidize other firms. Because the investing company
doesn’t capture the full benefit of its expenditures, it has weaker incentives
to secure its systems. And because other companies are able to free ride on
the investing firm’s expenditures, they have weaker incentives to adopt
defenses of their own.
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
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Coyne & Leeson, supra note 14, at 479.
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Id.; see also Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 534 n.13 (2002).
Coyne & Leeson, supra note 14, at 479; Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 10.
See infra notes 126–32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 134–44 and accompanying text.
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These externality and free-rider problems are largely overlooked in the
law review literature. The vast majority of commentary regards cybersecurity as a problem of the criminal law or the law of armed conflict.91 The
problem is not that these conventional approaches are mistaken. The
problem is that they are incomplete. Treating cyber-security as a matter for
cops or soldiers brings certain challenges into sharper focus. But it tends to
obscure other problems—problems that may be illuminated if we consult
alternative regulatory frameworks, such as environmental law, antitrust
law, products liability law, and public health law. In short, a wider
selection of analytical lenses allows us to fully comprehend cyber-security
challenges in all their complexity. The following sections will explore these
frameworks and their relevance for cyber-security.
A. The Conventional Approaches: Law Enforcement and Armed Conflict
Scholars typically use a pair of analytical frameworks to understand
cyber-attacks: criminal law and the law of armed conflict. Consider the
former first. Broadly speaking, the criminal law seeks to protect people
from unjustified acts of violence against their persons or property. The
criminal law pursues this objective by imposing sanctions, such as
incarceration, on those adjudged to have violated the law. These penalties
will punish those who have transgressed society’s moral code (retribution),
dissuade the perpetrator or others from committing similar offenses in the
future (specific or general deterrence), isolate the dangerous perpetrator
from society (incapacitation), or teach the misguided perpetrator the error
of his ways (rehabilitation). Cyber-attacks fit into this conceptual
framework fairly comfortably. A person who hacks into another’s
computer may have thereby violated any number of laws, such as the
federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.92 Society regards this sort of
conduct as sufficiently blameworthy that it proscribes it and subjects those
who engage in it to criminal penalties of varying severity.
Scholars who approach cyber-security from a law enforcement
perspective focus on the “whodunit” questions. Who was responsible for
launching this particular attack? Was it an individual hacker or a larger
criminal enterprise? This framework also emphasizes jurisdictional
questions.93 Which courts properly may exercise subject matter jurisdiction
over a given cyber-attack?94 State courts, federal courts, or perhaps
international tribunals? Should jurisdiction be determined by the location of
the target? By the location of the attacker? By the location in which the
effects of the attack are felt? Should cyber-attacks be subject to universal
91

See sources cited supra note 19.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp. 2012).
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jurisdiction—the notion that a court may try certain crimes regardless of
where in the world they occurred?95 How might courts gain personal
jurisdiction over those suspected of committing the attack, especially if
they are overseas? Do existing extradition treaties cover the range of
offenses that cyber-criminals might commit? Should the United States
negotiate new bilateral agreements with key international partners, such as
our European allies, or with countries in which cyber-attacks are likely to
originate, such as China and Russia? Or should there be a multilateral
global convention on cyber-crime, one that will facilitate extradition of
suspects from their home countries to the states in which they will stand
trial for their alleged crimes?
The law enforcement framework also emphasizes punishment and
deterrence.96 Certain economic theories of criminal law posit that a person’s
willingness to commit crimes is a function of the expected penalty for that
activity—i.e., the sanction for the particular offense discounted by the
probability that the person will get caught.97 The greater the sanction, and
the greater the likelihood of detection and punishment, the less likely a
person will choose to commit that crime. The question then becomes what
should be done to increase the deterrent effect of laws that proscribe
various cyber-intrusions. Should the penalties for violating these statutes be
increased? Should society invest more resources in detecting cyber-crime,
thereby increasing the probability that perpetrators will be caught and
punished?98 Or should lawmakers pursue “cost deterrence,” the objective of
which is to increase the costs one must incur to perpetrate cyber-crime?99
The second conventional approach regards cyber-attacks from the
standpoint of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). The LOAC, also known
as international humanitarian law (IHL), is a body of international law that
regulates a state’s ability to use force in several ways. First, it sets forth the
circumstances in which a state lawfully may engage in armed conflict—the
jus ad bellum regulations. For instance, the United Nations Charter forbids
signatories “from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state,”100 but also recognizes an inherent right
95

See generally Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s
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to use force in self-defense against an “armed attack.”101 Second, the LOAC
regulates what kinds of force may be used during an authorized armed
conflict—the jus in bello regulations. For instance, a state may not
deliberately kill civilians or destroy civilian infrastructure (the “distinction”
or “discrimination” principle), may not inadvertently inflict harm on
civilian populations and structures that is disproportionate to the
importance of the military objective (“proportionality”), and may not cause
more harm to legitimate targets than is needed to achieve the military
objective (“necessity”).102
Scholars who see cyber-security as an armed conflict problem
typically focus on determining who was responsible for a particular
attack.103 Was this attack launched by a state or an international terrorist
organization, in which case the LOAC may permit some form of military
retaliation? Or was it carried out by criminals, in which case the distinction
principle likely would rule out a military response? If the attacker was in
fact a state or terrorist group, which one? Was it China, or maybe Russia,
or perhaps North Korea? Or was it al Qaeda, or al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, or Hezbollah? Until the identity of the assailant is known, it will
be unclear against whom to retaliate—or whether retaliation is lawful at
all.104
Another set of important questions concerns how to characterize a
cyber-incident. Is a given intrusion espionage or an attack? It can be quite
difficult to answer that question because the steps an intruder would take to
steal information often are identical to the steps it would take to bring down
a system. If the intrusion is properly understood as an attack, does it rise to
the level of an “armed attack” that triggers the right of self-defense?105
Should these questions be resolved with an “instrument-based” test, which
counts a cyber-intrusion as an armed attack when it causes harms that
previously could have been caused only by a kinetic attack?106 Or a less
demanding “effects-” or “consequence-based” test, which counts a cyberintrusion as an armed attack when it has a sufficiently harmful effect on the
targeted state?107 Or an even less demanding “intent” test, which counts a
101

U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs . . . .”).
102
See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE 261–66 (2007)
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298–99 (2003) (same).
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cyber-intrusion as an armed attack whenever it evinces a hostile intent,
regardless of whether it causes actual damage?108 The LOAC approach also
addresses possible responses. When a nation suffers a cyber-attack, is it
limited to responding with a cyber-intrusion of its own?109 Or may a victim
retaliate by launching a kinetic attack?110 How severe must the cyber-attack
be before a kinetic response would be justified?
Other problems for the LOAC arise from the fact that much of the
world’s critical infrastructure is dual use—it serves a state’s civilian
population but the state’s political leadership and armed forces also rely
upon it.111 In the United States, for instance, civilian networks carry up to
98% of the federal government’s communications traffic,112 including 95%
of defense-related traffic.113 When, if ever, may a combatant direct a cyberattack at an adversary’s dual-use infrastructure?114 Finally, the LOAC
focuses on deterrence. Given the differences between cyber-conflicts and
kinetic ones, how can a state dissuade its adversaries from committing
cyber-attacks? Key differences include the difficulty in determining who
was responsible for a given intrusion, the possibility that a retaliatory
cyber-strike might end up harming innocent third parties more than the
actual assailant, and the fact that different nations are more or less
dependent on cyber-infrastructure and therefore have more or less to lose
from an exchange of cyber-weapons.115
A central problem for both the law enforcement and armed conflict
approaches to cyber-security is determining the identity of the assailant.
Attribution is extraordinarily difficult; the challenges are “staggering”116
and “[n]o one has come close to solving” them.117 The problem is inherent
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in the basic architecture of the Internet. The Internet’s TCP/IP protocol118
was designed to move packets of data as efficiently as possible; it is utterly
unconcerned with who sent them.119 As such, it is fairly easy for attackers
to obscure their true identities by routing their intrusions through a series of
dispersed intermediary computers.120 These attribution difficulties can
severely frustrate the law enforcement and armed conflict approaches to
cyber-security.
B. Cyber-security as an Environmental Law Problem
Given the limits of the conventional cyber-security frameworks, it’s
advisable to look for guidance in other legal disciplines—particularly the
regulatory disciplines that confront the same sorts of problems seen in the
cyber-security context. For instance, a principal goal of environmental law
is to regulate externalities. Various forms of environmental degradation
involve negative externalities—i.e., spillover costs that are imposed on
third parties and that are not transmitted through prices.121 Sometimes these
externalities are geographic: toxins emitted by a factory in Ohio might
affect residents of New York.122 Sometimes they are temporal: carbon
emissions today might affect the planet’s climate for future generations.123
The critical point is that these costs are borne by people other than those
who are responsible for the pollution, and market transactions cannot
readily be used to internalize the costs onto the polluter. Many scholars
therefore believe that regulatory controls are necessary.124 These controls
often take the form of strict limits on regulated activity backed by the threat
of civil damages or criminal sanctions,125 though less coercive forms of
regulation exist.
Cyber-security can be understood in terms of negative externalities.126
A given firm—whether it is a company that produces or uses computer
118
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products—will not bear the full costs of its cyber-insecurities. (By “cyberinsecurity,” I mean a firm’s failure to implement defenses capable of
defeating a cyber-attack.) Instead, some of these costs are borne by third
parties; they are partially externalized.127 Imagine a cyber-attack that
disables a power plant. The intrusion would harm the utility as well as
consumers who buy electricity from it128—hospitals, manufacturers, and
others. The attack also would harm a number of third parties who have no
relationship with the power company—hospital patients, downstream
manufacturers in the supply chain, and so on. These “indirect effects of a
cyber attack are almost always more important to the attacker than the
direct effects.”129 And it would be prohibitively expensive to internalize
them through market exchanges; the transaction costs would be staggering,
in part because it is extraordinarily difficult to identify the universe of third
parties affected by the intrusion.
The fact that many costs of cyber-attacks are externalized is
enormously significant. Some commentators have argued that firms have
strong “financial incentives to protect [their systems] from cyber
attacks.”130 Those incentives are weaker than might be supposed. A firm
that is deciding how much to invest in securing its systems will not account
for the costs that an attack will impose on third parties.131 Firms tend to
oversupply pollution, since they capture all the benefits of the associated
productive activity but not all of the resulting costs. In a similar way, firms
tend to oversupply cyber-insecurity—or, to say the same thing, they tend to
undersupply cyber-defense—because they internalize all of the benefits but
only some of the costs.132 Firms thus may invest less in cyber-defense than
would be optimal from a societal standpoint.
The point can be illustrated with a simple hypothetical. Imagine a
cyber-attack that will result in $1 million in expected costs for the target
firm and $10 million in expected costs for third parties. From a societal
standpoint, it would be worthwhile to invest up to $11 million to prevent
the attack. But from the company’s standpoint, it would only be worthwhile
to invest up to $1 million. If the firm spent more than that, the cost of the
the Internet is socially beneficial because it produces network effects; by joining the network, the user
increases its value to all users. POST, supra note 94, at 47–49.
127
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precautions would exceed the benefit to the firm and the firm would be
conferring uncompensated benefits on third parties. Thus, there is a gap
between the welfare of the company and the welfare of society as a whole.
Levels of cyber-security investment that are efficient for particular firms
may turn out to be inefficient for society at large.133
Cyber-security can also be understood as a positive externality. When
a firm expends resources to defend itself against intruders, that investment
can make other users’ systems marginally more secure as well. This is so
because the defenses not only help prevent harm to the company’s system,
they also help prevent the firm’s system from being used to inflict harm on
others’ systems.134 If Pepsi’s network is well-defended, it is less likely to be
infected by a worm and thus less likely to transmit the malware through the
Internet to Coke. The effect is to decrease the overall incidence of
infection, but the investing firm does not capture the full benefit. A classic
positive externality. Cyber-defenses can differ from realspace defenses in
this respect. If I install an alarm in my home, that might prevent burglars
from breaking into my house, but it will not necessarily decrease the
overall incidence of burglary. The alarm might simply displace the burglar
who would have targeted me onto my neighbor135—a form of negative
externality. By contrast, cyber-defenses can make my system more secure
at the same time they increase the overall security of the Internet.136
Relatedly, some aspects of cyber-security resemble public goods.137 A
public good is both nonrivalrous (one person’s use of the good does not
reduce its availability for use by others) and nonexcludable (the owner of
the good cannot prevent particular persons from using it).138 A classic
example of a public good is a large municipal park: the park is open to all
comers, and one person enjoying a crisp fall afternoon on a bench generally
does not prevent anyone else from doing the same. Some scholars argue
that cyber-security information—information about the vulnerability of a
particular system, or the most effective way to counter a particular cyber-
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threat—is a public good that the market will tend to underproduce.139 There
is also a sense in which defensive measures themselves are public goods.
Like a municipal park, cyber-defenses can be nonrivalrous.140 When Pepsi
expends resources to secure its computer network, that does not decrease
the amount of security available for Coke. Doing so can actually increase
security for third parties, as attackers will be unable to use Pepsi’s secured
system as a platform to launch attacks on other companies. Cyber-defenses
also can be nonexcludable.141 When Pepsi secures its system against
conscription into a botnet—a network of “zombie” computers ordered by
the “master” to commence a DDOS attack142—it isn’t possible to specify
which third parties will enjoy the benefit of Pepsi’s immunity; for instance,
protecting Coke but not Snapple. All such users are thereby protected from
attacks launched from Pepsi’s system.
Environmental law and the underlying economic principles it reflects
thus provide an important framework to understand the tendency of some
firms to neglect cyber-defense. It’s a free-rider problem.143 Companies tend
to underinvest in cyber-defenses for the same reason they tend to
underinvest in pollution controls—because insecurities that result in
successful attacks produce negative externalities that are borne by third
parties. Firms also tend to underinvest in cyber-defenses because such
expenditures create positive externalities and provide opportunities for free
riding. “The individual undertaking the security precautions does not
internalize all the benefits, and will seek to free-ride off of the efforts taken
by others”; as a result, “theory predicts that security will be undersupplied
on the market.”144 Understood in these terms, the challenge for a cybersecurity regime is to internalize the externalities—to ensure that firms that
fail to secure their systems are made to bear the resulting costs.
C. . . . as an Antitrust Problem
Antitrust law is another useful framework for understanding cybersecurity problems. The ultimate goal of antitrust, promoting consumer
welfare, is achieved by restraining businesses from engaging in
anticompetitive conduct. Antitrust law is especially concerned about the
possibility that firms will take coordinated action that undermines
139
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competition—an agreement to divide a market, for instance. Antitrust also
is apprehensive about information sharing among competitors; such
exchanges, it is feared, “can facilitate anti-competitive collusion or
unilateral oligopolistic behavior.”145 Hence Section 1 of the Sherman Act
sweepingly prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States.”146
Antitrust law often subjects coordinated conduct by multiple
competitor firms to stricter scrutiny than isolated conduct by a single
firm.147 The law condemns many such arrangements—namely, “naked”
restraints or coordinated actions that are “formed with the objectively
intended purpose or likely effect of increasing price or decreasing output in
the short run”148—under a per se rule against cartelization.149 With a per se
rule, there is no need to inquire whether a particular arrangement actually
has anticompetitive effects. Antitrust law takes a shortcut and simply
presumes that the conduct is harmful.150 This approach may lead to the
occasional false positive—coordinated action that is actually beneficial to
consumers but that nevertheless is condemned as unlawful. But the
conventional wisdom is that the costs of these false positives would be
dwarfed by the decision costs of distinguishing the small number of naked
restraints that are procompetitive from the much larger number that are
anticompetitive.
Yet some interfirm cooperation is beneficial to consumers,151 and
antitrust law can struggle to determine whether a given instance of joint
action is pro- or anticompetitive.152 In the cyber-security context, various
forms of coordination and information sharing can help firms better defend
themselves against intrusions, and thus prevent consumers from incurring
losses. Firms in a particular industry might agree to exchange threat
information.153 An ISP that discovers it has been victimized by a particular
form of malware could alert others to be on the lookout for the same threat.
Or firms could share vulnerability information.154 A power plant that learns
that its SCADA system can be compromised by a particular type of
intrusion could tell other companies about the vulnerability. Firms also
145
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might share countermeasure information. A company might discover an
especially effective way to defend against a DDOS attack, and the
company might notify other firms to use the same technique. Finally, an
industry might agree to establish a uniform set of cyber-security standards,
along with monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that all
members are implementing the agreed-upon measures. They might, in other
words, form something like a cartel.
Which brings us to the problem. Coordinating on cyber-defense could
give rise to antitrust liability, and firms therefore are reluctant to share
information or to adopt common security standards.155 These liability fears
appear to be fairly widespread. A 2002 analysis found that, among the
private sector’s “major concerns about fully communicating
cybervulnerabilities,” one of the most important is “the potential for
antitrust action against cooperating companies.”156 In a 2009 report, the
American Bar Association (ABA) likewise recounted the concerns of
several firms that “antitrust laws created a barrier to some forms of
sharing” cyber-security information.157 Government officials have reported
the same fears. The White House’s 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review
acknowledged that some interfirm coordination takes place, but went on to
report that “some in industry are concerned that the information sharing
and collective planning that occurs among members of the same sector
under existing partnership models might be viewed as ‘collusive’ or
contrary to laws forbidding restraints on trade.”158
These concerns seem well-founded. There are a number of scenarios in
which cyber-security coordination could trigger liability under federal
antitrust statutes. For instance, suppose that firms in a particular industry
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agree to implement a uniform set of cyber-security practices.159 It is
improbable that these new standards would be costless. Whether the
companies have agreed to purchase and install new firewall software, or to
transition from vulnerable commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems to
more expensive proprietary systems, the measures are likely to affect their
bottom lines. Industry members might decide to absorb these increased
costs, depending on the elasticity of consumer demand for the goods or
services they offer. But they might further decide to pass on these costs to
consumers, either in the form of a general price hike or as a free standing
surcharge. Would the arrangement be lawful? This sort of venture may
amount to price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.160 Even
if the participating firms do not set a specific price for their products (e.g.,
everyone will now charge $50 for widgets instead of $45), they still
establish a premium that will be assessed for their products (e.g., everyone
will increase the price they charge for their widgets by $5). The economic
effect is the same. Indeed, the arrangement may even amount to a “naked”
restraint that results in reflexive condemnation under the per se rule.161
As a second example, consider an arrangement that imposes no new
costs on consumers—at least not directly. Suppose firms in a particular
industry agree to install intrusion-detection or -prevention capabilities to
scan for malware on their networks.162 These systems rely on a technique
known as “deep-packet inspection,” in which all data traversing the
network is scanned and checked against signature files of known
malware.163 The effect is often to slow down the network’s performance,
sometimes dramatically.164 Suppose further that the firms decide to absorb
the costs of the monitoring or detection system rather than pass them on to
their consumers. Would that forbearance save the arrangement from
159
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antitrust liability? Not necessarily. The shared security standards still
plausibly could be described as an unlawful price-fixing agreement. While
the participating companies have not agreed to raise prices directly, they
have indirectly accomplished something similar; instead of requiring
consumers to pay a higher price for the same product, the firms have
agreed to require consumers to pay the same price for a lesser product
(where speed is an important component of the product’s value).
Notice that clear and unambiguous prohibitions on interfirm
coordination may not be necessary to deter businesses from participating in
joint cyber-security ventures. Mere uncertainty about the applicability of
the antitrust laws—and the corresponding risk of liability—may be enough.
The deterrent effect is likely to be especially strong because of the severe
sanctions that may be imposed on antitrust defendants. Firms that are
alleged to have violated federal antitrust laws face criminal prosecutions as
well as federal civil actions,165 state civil actions,166 and lawsuits by
aggrieved private parties.167 Each type of civil litigation carries the prospect
of treble damages payouts to the successful plaintiffs.168 Private firms
therefore will have good reasons to avoid coordinating their efforts to
improve cyber-security.
To be sure, fear of antitrust liability is not the only reason firms are
reluctant to coordinate and share information. The difficulties of forming
and maintaining cartels are well-known. Among other problems, individual
cartel members have strong incentives to cheat, such as by offering a
greater quantity of product or by charging a different price than allotted by
the cartel.169 In the cyber-security context, businesses will have comparable
incentives to shirk their responsibilities to implement any agreed-upon (and
likely costly) security standards. In addition, firms may be especially
reluctant to share information with their competitors.170 If a firm discovers
an effective way to defend its systems against a particular form of cyberintrusion, that information gives it a comparative advantage over rivals that
may not be as adept at protecting their own networks. Sharing the
information with competitors enables them to free ride and thereby
eliminates the firm’s comparative advantage. As such, even if fears of
antitrust liability were eliminated completely, it is doubtful that firms
would fully cooperate with one another. Nevertheless, liability concerns
appear to be a significant impediment to cyber-security coordination and
165
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information sharing. Reducing these fears would not by itself ensure
cooperation, but might make it more likely at the margin.
D. . . . as a Products Liability Problem
Private investment in cyber-security also resembles a tort problem—
more precisely, a products liability problem. Broadly speaking, the law of
products liability has two complementary goals.171 First, from an ex post
perspective, the law seeks to compensate consumers injured by products
that did not perform as expected. Second, from an ex ante perspective,
products liability law uses the risk of money damages to incentivize firms
to take reasonable precautions when designing and manufacturing products.
The branch of products liability law that is most relevant to cybersecurity is design defects. In a design defect case, the theory is that “the
intended design of the product line itself is inadequate and needlessly
dangerous.”172 (By contrast, a manufacturing defect occurs when a product
suffers from “a random failing or imperfection,”173 such as a crack in a
Coke bottle that causes it to explode,174 and a marketing defect occurs when
an otherwise safe product “become[s] unreasonably dangerous and
defective if no information explains [its] use or warns of [its] dangers.”)175
In its infancy, products liability law typically assigned blame on a theory of
strict liability.176 A plaintiff could recover damages by establishing that a
given product had a defective design and that he was injured by that defect;
it wasn’t necessary to show that the manufacturer was negligent, or
otherwise blameworthy, in producing the defect.177 The modern approach
abandons strict liability in favor of a negligence standard.178 How do courts
determine whether a manufacturer was at fault when it produced a product
with a design defect? One common approach is the risk–utility test.179 The
test, which has its roots in Learned Hand’s negligence formula,180 compares
171
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“the risks of the product as designed against the costs of making the
product safer.”181 If the risks can be reduced by a significant amount at a
relatively low cost, a manufacturer that declines to do so is negligent. If the
risks can be reduced only by a small amount at a relatively high cost, a
manufacturer that declines to do so is not negligent.
Tort liability creates important incentives for manufacturers to prevent
or eliminate design defects.182 Imagine a company that makes residential
furnaces; it is trying to decide whether to remedy a design defect that
increases the probability that the furnaces will explode. The company will
do so if the expected benefits of reducing the risk of explosion exceed the
expected costs of making the fix. Without tort liability, the benefit of
making defect-free furnaces is lower than it otherwise would be. Furnaces
that occasionally explode would damage the firm’s reputation, and some
consumers likely would buy competitors’ products instead. The
manufacturer benefits to the extent it reduces these harms. But it does not
face the prospect of paying money damages to homeowners whose houses
burned down. The cost–benefit calculus looks very different once a
products liability regime is in place. Tort liability increases a firm’s
expected benefit of remedying design defects—namely, the benefit of
foregone money damages, discounted by the probability that they would be
awarded. It thus increases the number of circumstances in which firms will
find it welfare maximizing to improve the safety of their products. The
result is that, at the margin, products will be safer than they otherwise
would be.
Internet-related goods and services sometimes suffer from design
defects that increase their vulnerability to cyber-attacks.183 Perhaps the best
known example is Microsoft Windows. The operating system software,
which accounts for more than 90% of the PC market,184 is notoriously
riddled with vulnerabilities. These flaws stem in part from the software’s
size. In 2006, Microsoft projected that Windows Vista would feature some
50 million lines of code, compared to 35 million for Windows XP (released
in 2001) and just 15 million for Windows 95 (released in 1995).185 It is
more or less inevitable that the programmers who write these millions of
lines will make mistakes, and it can be quite difficult to detect and repair
them.186 (Given that it probably would cost a great deal to eliminate all of
these vulnerabilities, the failure to do so may not be negligent under the
181
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risk–utility test.)187 Other examples abound. Indeed, many of the
vulnerabilities described in Part I can be understood as the results of design
defects. Consider the decision by power companies to connect generators
and other elements of the electrical grid to the Internet. This might be
described as a form of defective system design, in that Internet connectivity
exposes the nation’s power grid to potentially catastrophic cyber-attacks in
exchange for relatively modest benefits.188 The same can be said of
companies that continue to protect their SCADA systems with vendorsupplied default passwords189—a defect, incidentally, that could be
remedied at a negligible cost.
The incentives to cure these design defects are fairly weak because
poor cyber-security generally does not trigger civil liability.190 One reason
for this is a venerable chestnut of tort law known as the economic loss
doctrine. The economic loss doctrine provides that, while a defendant who
causes physical injuries is also liable for any resulting economic harms, he
generally is not liable for freestanding economic harms.191 Many of the
harms that would result from a cyber-attack on, say, the power grid or the
financial sector would be purely economic in nature. An automobile
manufacturer might be unable to run its assembly line because the power is
out, or a consumer might default on a loan because he can’t make a
payment online. Few of these harms would derive from a physical injury,
and they therefore would not be actionable. For instance, in 2009, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissed a lawsuit brought by
credit unions against a retailer after hackers accessed the retailer’s
computer systems and stole customer credit card data.192 The court agreed
with the lower court’s conclusion that, because “the plaintiffs suffered only
economic harm due to the theft of the credit card account information,” the
“economic loss doctrine barred recovery on their negligence claims.”193
187
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Cyber-attacks that cause physical injuries would remain actionable, as
would any resulting economic harms. So, for instance, if an attacker
exploited a design defect in a dam’s control system and opened the
floodgates,194 the dam operator might be held liable for the deaths of the
downstream landowners and any corresponding economic losses.
The problem also can be understood in Coasean terms.195 Consider the
famous example of a train that emits sparks that burn the wheat in
neighboring fields.196 Regardless of whether the legal entitlement is initially
assigned to the railroad (a right to emit sparks) or the farmers (a right to be
free from incinerated crops), the parties will bargain to reallocate the
entitlement to its socially most efficient use, assuming that the transaction
costs are sufficiently small. In the cyber-security context, the absence of
tort liability essentially grants firms a legal right to refrain from taking
precautions that would protect third parties from attacks on their systems or
products. This may be an efficient allocation of the legal entitlement in
some contexts, but not always. In these latter circumstances, companies and
third parties theoretically should negotiate and establish a new legal right to
be free from harm due to cyber-intrusions. But Coasean bargaining over
cyber-security seems unlikely to occur because of the staggering
transaction costs. It would be prohibitively expensive, if not impossible, for
companies to bargain with everyone who conceivably could be injured by
cyber-attacks on their systems or products.
Beyond tort, it is doubtful that other sources of law will threaten
cyber-security shirkers with liability. Contract law does not seem well
suited to the task. Software manufacturers typically do not offer warranties
that their products are secure.197 Indeed, some do not “sell” software at all.
They merely grant a license, and users cannot install the software unless
they click a button to accept terms and conditions that usually include a
limit on the manufacturer’s liability.198 Likewise, federal law extends broad
immunity to ISPs. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
provides that an ISP will not “be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”199 At least
one federal appellate court has interpreted this statute to foreclose a lawsuit
alleging that an ISP negligently failed to prevent malware from being sent

bar recovery for economic harms resulting from a cyber-intrusion); Patco Constr. Co. v. People’s
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over its network.200 From the standpoint of a profit-maximizing firm, the
expected benefits of remedying a cyber-vulnerability often will be lower
than the expected costs. Without the prospect of tort liability, firms have
weaker incentives to invest in measures to secure their systems and
products against cyber-attacks.
Not only do liability fears fail to incentivize firms to take better
precautions against cyber-attacks, they can actually discourage them from
doing so. Companies sometimes are reluctant to better secure their systems
because of concerns that these steps could expose them to civil liability.
For instance, ISPs typically do not offer assistance if they discover that
their customers’ PCs have been infected by malware. ISPs often are able to
tell, through routine traffic analysis, that a particular machine on the
network is part of a botnet or has been infected by a worm.201 “[B]ut they
don’t dare inform the customer (much less cut off access) out of fear that
customers would . . . try to sue them for violating their privacy.”202 Doing
so might even be a crime. The Federal Wiretap Act makes it unlawful to
“intentionally
intercept[] . . .
any
wire,
oral,
or
electronic
communication,”203 and some companies fear that filtering botnet traffic or
other malware might fall within this prohibition.204 And while federal law
makes an exception for ISPs that intercept communications to protect their
own property,205 there is no parallel exception for intercepts intended to
protect the property of subscribers. Likewise, some ISPs use deep packet
inspection to examine the data streams on their networks for malicious
code. This is probably lawful under the exception mentioned above, or a
separate exception for “mechanical or service quality control checks.”206
But even when they uncover malware, ISPs “have been reluctant to ‘black
hole’ (or kill) malicious traffic because of the risk that they might be sued
by customers whose service is interrupted.”207 Again, as in the antitrust
context, even if the applicable service contracts or state and federal laws do
not clearly forbid these measures, the mere risk of liability may be enough
to dissuade firms from undertaking them.208
While firms with poor cyber-defenses generally do not face the
prospect of civil lawsuits, there is one context in which a credible liability
threat exists. The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB Act) imposes
200
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liability for data breaches in the financial services sector. The Act directs a
group of federal agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, to issue data security
regulations for financial institutions.209 In particular, the Act mandates the
adoption of “administrative, technical, and physical safeguards” that will,
among other things, “insure the security and confidentiality of customer
records and information” and “protect against unauthorized access to or use
of such records.”210 The sanctions for violating these data security
requirements can be severe. Gramm–Leach–Bliley does not enumerate
specific penalties, but rather directs the enforcing agencies to apply the
Act’s requirements according to their respective enabling statutes.211 Thus,
for example, a bank subject to FTC jurisdiction would face a civil penalty
of up to $16,000 for each violation.212 If the FTC treated every customer
affected by a cyber-intrusion as a separate violation, the penalties could
very quickly become staggering.
Perhaps not coincidentally, financial institutions are widely believed to
do a better job of protecting customer data than members of other
industries.213 Unlike other firms, which typically spend only modest sums
on cyber-security, most banks devote “between 6 and 7 percent of their
entire information technology budgets.”214 Financial institutions also are
more likely to adopt specific security measures like intrusion-detection and
-prevention systems, antivirus software, smart cards, and biometrics.215 The
unique risk of liability that banks face may be responsible, at least in part,
for that record. The GLB Act has the effect of increasing the expected
benefit of cyber-security—namely, avoiding potentially crippling civil
penalties—and thus creates strong incentives for banks to invest in
defenses. (Another explanation is the risk of customer exit. Unlike, say, the
customers of public utilities, it is relatively easy for a depositor who fears
cyber-intrusions to switch banks, so the bank has an incentive to maintain
data integrity.)216
Of course, the GLB Act’s emphasis on protecting consumer data might
distort firms’ cyber-security investments. Rather than expending resources
on defenses against the attacks they regard as the most dangerous, or the
209
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most likely to occur, financial institutions will tend to prioritize defenses
against the one form of intrusion singled out by their regulators—the
compromise of customer data.217 The effect may be to ensure that firms are
well-defended against one threat at the expense of increased exposure to
many other threats.218 Even so, Gramm–Leach–Bliley remains an example
of how the risk of civil liability might be used to incentivize firms to
improve at least some of their cyber-defenses.
E. . . . as a Public Health Problem
As several scholars have noted, in more or less detail, cyber-security
can be thought of in terms of public health.219 A critically important goal for
any cyber-security regime is to keep attacks from happening and to contain
their ill effects.220 The same is true of public health, the ultimate goal of
which is prevention.221 Unlike medical practice, which typically has an ex
post orientation toward treating illnesses that have already occurred, public
health is primarily oriented toward ex ante solutions—preventing people
from contracting infectious diseases, preventing pathogens from spreading,
and so on. Broadly summarized, public health law, including the subset
known as public health emergency law, involves government efforts “to
persuade, create incentives, or even compel individuals and businesses to
conform to health and safety standards for the collective good.”222 Some
scholars defend these interventions on controversial paternalistic grounds.
The notion is that the state may curtail individuals’ freedoms to promote
their own physical health and safety.223 The more common justification is
the risk of harm to others: the state may coerce persons who have
contracted an infectious disease or are at risk of doing so to prevent them
from transmitting the disease to, and thereby harming, others.224 Seen in this
light, a principal objective of public health law is to internalize negative
217
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externalities—in particular, the costs associated with spreading infections
to others.
Public health law contemplates three specific measures that are
relevant here: mandatory inoculations to reduce susceptibility to infectious
diseases, biosurveillance to monitor for epidemics and other outbreaks, and
isolation and quarantine to treat those who have been infected and prevent
them from spreading the pathogen.225 We will consider each in turn along
with their potential relevance to cyber-security.
Inoculation, in which a healthy subject is exposed to a pathogen, helps
prevent disease both directly (a person who is inoculated against a disease
is thereby rendered immune) and indirectly (the person’s immunity reduces
the risk that he will transmit the disease to others). Inoculation mandates
can take several forms. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, state
and local governments sometimes opted for direct regulation—a firm legal
requirement that citizens must receive a particular vaccine, backed by the
threat of sanctions.226 In the 1905 case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts,227 the
Supreme Court upheld such a requirement against a lawsuit invoking the
Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities, due process, and equal
protection clauses. According to the Court, mandatory inoculation is a
permissible exercise of the states’ police powers.228 The modern approach
usually involves a lighter touch. Now, state and local governments
typically create incentives for citizens to undergo inoculation by making it
a condition of eligibility for certain valuable benefits. The best known
example is to deny children access to public schools unless they have been
vaccinated.229 The Supreme Court upheld such a scheme in 1922 in Zucht v.
King.230
It isn’t necessary to inoculate all members of a population to frustrate
the transmission of a given disease. This is so because of “herd immunity.”
When large numbers of a population are immune to a given contagious
disease, their immunity helps prevent the disease from spreading, even to
those who are not immune.231 The critical number is typically around 85%
of the population, but it can be as low as 75% for some diseases, such as
mumps, and as high as 95% for others, such as pertussis.232 Herd immunity
is a form of positive externality—those who undergo vaccination provide
225
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an uncompensated benefit to those who do not—which creates a potential
free-rider problem.233 Many people would prefer to enjoy the benefits of
herd immunity without themselves undergoing vaccination, which is costly
in terms of money, discomfort, and risk of reaction. This free-rider problem
weakens each person’s incentive to undergo vaccination, and overall
vaccinations may drop below the levels needed to support herd immunity.
State and local governments therefore sometimes use their coercive powers
to require inoculation. (Another approach would be to provide subsidies to
those who have been inoculated. Public school vaccination requirements
can be understood in these terms; the government is subsidizing the
education of children who are inoculated.)
Ensuring widespread immunity—not to disease, but to malicious
code—is also an important goal of cyber-security. The average Internetconnected computer may be even more susceptible to infection by malware
than the average person is to infection by a pathogen, because malicious
code can propagate more efficiently than disease. Many pathogens are
transmitted by person-to-person contact; you are unlikely to contract polio
unless you come into close proximity with someone who is already
infected. But one can contract malware from virtually any networked
computer in the world. The Internet effectively brings dispersed systems
into direct contact with one another. Alternatively, the Internet is a disease
vector that, like mosquitoes and malaria, can transmit a contagion between
dispersed systems. It is therefore essential for the elements at the edge of
the network, such as the SCADA system that runs the local power plant, to
maintain effective defenses against cyber-intrusions, such as isolating the
power plant’s controls from the public Internet. And there’s the rub. As
with herd immunity, cyber-security raises free-rider problems.234 A user
who takes steps to prevent his computer from being infected by a worm or
impressed into a botnet thereby makes other systems more secure; if the
user’s machine is not infected, it cannot transmit the malware to others. But
the user receives no compensation from those who receive this benefit; he
does not internalize the positive externality. He therefore has weaker
incentives to secure his system, as he—like everyone else—would prefer to
free ride on others’ investments. A critical challenge for any cyber-security
regime is to reverse these incentives.
The second key element of public health law is biosurveillance.
“Biosurveillance is the systematic monitoring of a wide range of health
data of potential value in detecting emerging health threats . . . .”235 Public
health officials collect and analyze data to determine a given disease’s
233
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incidence, or “the ‘rate at which new cases occur in a population during a
specified period,’” as well as its prevalence, or “the ‘proportion of a
population that are cases at a point in time.’”236 Effective biosurveillance is
a vital first step in managing an epidemic or other outbreak.237
Biosurveillance takes place through a partnership among the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, the CDC’s state level counterparts, and
front line health care providers, such as hospitals, clinics, and individual
medical practitioners. Many, if not all, states have enacted legislation
requiring specified health care professionals to notify state authorities if
their patients have contracted any number of infectious diseases,238 such as
smallpox or polio.239 These reports typically include the patient’s name, the
type of disease, medical history, and other personal information.240 State
authorities then share the data with the CDC. These reports are not required
by law, but most states appear to be fairly conscientious about them.241
Public health law thus uses a system of distributed surveillance. No central
regulator is responsible for collecting all the data needed to detect and
respond to infectious disease outbreaks. Instead, the system relies on
individual nodes within a far-flung network—from state agencies to
hospitals to individual doctors—to gather the necessary information and
route it to the CDC’s central storehouse. The CDC then analyzes the data
and issues alerts advising state agencies and medical practitioners about
disease trends and offering recommendations about how to respond.242
The third public health intervention involves containing infectious
diseases once an outbreak has occurred, and preventing them from
spreading further.243 Two key measures are isolation and quarantine.244 The
goal of each is to segregate from the population those who have contracted
236
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or been exposed to an infectious disease, and thus prevent them from
transmitting it to those who are well.245 Isolation and quarantine are often
coupled with mandatory treatment, which helps reduce the risk of further
contagion; a person who has been cured of an infectious disease cannot
transmit it to others.246 The rationale for these interventions is the familiar
harm principle—the risk that a person who has contracted or been exposed
to a pathogen will infect others.247 Isolation and quarantine thus seek to
reduce negative externalities.
At the federal level, isolation and quarantine are accomplished under
the Public Health Service Act of 1944. The Secretary of Health and Human
Services has authority under the Act “to make and enforce such regulations
as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission,
or spread of communicable diseases” into or within the United States.248
The law further provides for “the apprehension, detention, or conditional
release” of persons who may have been exposed to any one of several
communicable diseases that the President has specified by executive
order.249 The list, which was updated most recently in 2005,250 includes
cholera, tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, SARS, and several other
diseases.251 Large-scale isolation and quarantine are rarely used; the most
recent example is from the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, which was carried
out under different legal authorities.252 However, isolation and quarantine
are sometimes used for particular individuals. In May 2007, HHS issued an
isolation order for an American with multidrug-resistant tuberculosis who
flew from the Czech Republic to Canada and then crossed the land border
into the United States.253 Violations of the quarantine regulations carry
criminal penalties, including a fine of up to $1000 and incarceration for up
to a year.254
Both biosurveillance and isolation/quarantine carry important lessons
for cyber-security. Like the public health system, effective cyber-defenses
245
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depend on information about the incidence and prevalence of various kinds
of malware. Users need to know what new forms of malicious code are
circulating on the Internet in order to secure their systems against them.
And measures resembling isolation and quarantine can help ensure that
systems infected with malicious code do not spread the contagion to other,
healthy computers.
There is, of course, a significant difference between infectious diseases
and malicious computer code: diseases typically develop and spread on
their own, whereas malware is created by human beings and sometimes
requires human intervention to propagate. This is true as far as it goes, but
the differences between cyberspace and realspace pathogens can be
overstated. Infectious diseases can be engineered (e.g., biological
weapons), and sometimes malware is able to spread on its own (e.g., a
worm that is programmed to search for other computers on which to
replicate itself255). Another potential obstacle is the tension between antique
public health legislation and contemporary constitutional law. These
statutes often restrict civil liberties and privacy to a degree rarely seen
today,256 and the judicial precedents upholding them against various
constitutional challenges typically antedate the Supreme Court’s modern
civil rights and liberties jurisprudence. It is not clear that today’s Court
would uphold, say, mandatory vaccination of adults as readily as it did in
1905.257 Yet even if public health law fits uneasily with modern
constitutional law, it can still be a useful framework for cyber-security
because, as explained below, the cyber versions of public health
interventions can be friendlier to civil liberties and privacy than their
realspace counterparts.258
III. REGULATORY PROBLEMS, REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
This concluding Part examines the responses of environmental,
antitrust, products liability, and public health law to various challenges, and
it considers how those solutions might be adapted for cyber-security. The
possible responses to cyber-insecurity are determined by our antecedent
choice of how to describe that problem. If we regard cyber-security from
the standpoint of law enforcement and armed conflict, we will tend to favor
the responses of law enforcement and armed conflict—stronger penalties
for cyber-intrusions, retaliating with kinetic attacks, and so on. Those are
plausible frameworks and equally plausible solutions. But they are not the
only ones. A wider angle lens is needed.
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Taken together, the regulatory frameworks described in Part II suggest
that an effective cyber-security regime should include four components:
(1) monitoring and surveillance to detect malicious code, (2) hardening
vulnerable targets and enabling them to defeat intrusions, (3) building
resilient systems that can function during an attack and recover quickly,
and (4) responding in the aftermath of an attack.259 There are two
complementary objectives here: preventing intrusions from happening at
all, and enabling firms to withstand the intrusions that do take place.260
Stronger defenses would provide an obvious, first-order level of protection:
better defense means less damage. They also would provide an important
second-order level of protection: stronger defenses can help achieve
deterrence. By enabling victims to defeat, survive, and recover from cyberattacks, these measures increase the expected costs of an intrusion to an
attacker and also decrease its expected benefits.261 And that means weaker
incentives to attack in the first place; why try to take down the power grid
if the effort is likely to fail?
Of course, it is inevitable that some attacks will succeed. Some
intrusions can be prevented or mitigated but others cannot, and any
defensive scheme is necessarily imperfect.262 This is so because offense is
much less costly than defense in cyberspace. “Defending a modern
information system” is like “defending a large, thinly-populated territory
like the nineteenth century Wild West: the men in black hats can strike
anywhere, while the men in white hats have to defend everywhere.”263 The
goal therefore is not to develop impregnable defenses. Doing so may be
impossible from a technological standpoint and, even if such defenses were
feasible, they may be inefficiently costly.264 Instead, the goal is to attain
efficient levels of investment in defenses that are better at protecting
society’s critical systems than current defenses are.265 Another important
point is that cyber-defense is not a one-size-fits-all proposition. Security
259
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measures should be tailored to the unique risks faced by specific firms or
industries—their combinations of vulnerabilities, threats, and
consequences.266 The strongest, and presumably most costly, defenses
should be reserved for the firms that are most vulnerable to cyber-attacks,
that face the most severe threats (e.g., from foreign intelligence services as
opposed to recreational hackers), and whose compromise would have the
most devastating consequences for society. Strategically unimportant firms
might get by with modest defenses, whereas robust defenses may be
needed for critical industries.267 Finally, what follows is by no means an
exhaustive list of possible responses to cyber-insecurity. It is merely a list
of responses suggested by conceiving of cyber-security in environmental,
antitrust, products liability, and public health terms. Other solutions,
suggested by other analytical frameworks, may be just as promising.
A. Monitoring and Surveillance
Effective cyber-security depends on the generation and exchange of
information.268 An ideal system would create and distribute vulnerability
data (the holes intruders might exploit to gain access to computer systems),
threat data (the types of malware circulating on the Internet and the types of
attacks firms have suffered), and countermeasure data (steps that can be
taken to prevent or combat infection by a particular piece of malicious
code).269 Perhaps the best way to collect this information is through a
distributed surveillance network akin to the biosurveillance system at the
heart of public health law. Companies are unlikely to participate in this sort
of arrangement due to fears of liability under antitrust and other laws.270 A
suite of measures is therefore needed to help foster favorable incentives,
including subsidies, threats of liability, and offers of immunity. These steps
would not guarantee that firms will collect and share cyber-security data,
but they would make such arrangements more viable than they are at
present.
Public health law’s system of distributed biosurveillance seems well
suited to the challenge of gathering and disseminating cyber-security data.
Like health care providers who diagnose and then report their patients’
infectious diseases, firms could be tasked with monitoring their systems for
vulnerabilities and intrusions, then reporting their findings and the
countermeasures they have implemented to designated recipients.271 Such a
266
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system would take advantage of important information asymmetries.
Individual companies often know more than outsiders about the
vulnerabilities in their systems and the types of intrusions they have faced;
they have a comparative advantage in compiling this data.272 The principal
alternative—surveillance by a single, central regulator—is unlikely to be as
effective. As F.A. Hayek emphasized, “the knowledge of the [economic]
circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or
integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals
possess.”273 The same is true of cyber-security data. A central regulator
lacks the capacity to examine each device that is connected to the Internet
to determine its vulnerabilities, and cannot inspect every data packet
transiting the Internet to determine whether it contains malicious code. And
even if the scope of the project was not prohibitively vast, the privacy costs
associated with a central monitor—especially a government monitor—
would likely be intolerable.274 Instead, the better course would be to rely on
individual firms to gather the relevant information.275
While firms would be responsible for the lion’s share of monitoring,
the government still has an important role to play: providing especially
sensitive companies, such as power companies and ISPs, with information
about especially sophisticated forms of malware. Here, the comparative
advantage is reversed; the government’s highly resourceful intelligence
agencies are simply better than the private sector at detecting intrusions by
sophisticated adversaries like foreign militaries and developing
countermeasures.276 The government can provide these firms with the
signatures of malware used in previous attacks, and firms can use the
signature files to detect future intrusions. In 2010 the National Security
Agency began assisting Google in detecting intrusions into its systems. The
partnership was announced in the wake of reports that sophisticated
hackers, most likely affiliated with China’s intelligence service, had broken
into Google’s systems and collected data about users, including a number
of human rights activists.277 The NSA reportedly has entered a similar
partnership with a number of large banks.278
272
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At least two possibilities exist for how to structure the system used to
disseminate the information compiled by private firms. Some
commentators have called for a central repository of cyber-security data—a
“cyber-CDC,”279 as it were. Under such a system, an individual firm would
notify the clearinghouse if it discovers a new vulnerability in its systems, or
a new type of malicious code, or a particular countermeasure that is
effective against a particular kind of threat. The repository would analyze
the information, looking for broader trends in vulnerabilities and threats,
then issue alerts and recommendations to other firms. This clearinghouse
might be a government entity, as in public health law, but it need not be.
An alternative architecture would be for firms to exchange cyber-security
information with one another directly, on a peer-to-peer basis, rather than
first routing it through a central storehouse. One advantage of the peer-topeer approach is that it may be more resilient. A CDC-type clearinghouse
would be an attractive target for cyber-adversaries, and the entire system
would fail if it were compromised.
Distributed surveillance may be an even better fit for cyber-security
than for public health, for several reasons. First, malicious computer code
can often be detected more quickly than biological pathogens,280 which
means that countermeasures can be developed and put in place rapidly.
Biosurveillance can be slow because the incubation period for certain
diseases—the amount of time between when a disease is contracted and
when its symptoms first manifest—can be days or weeks. By contrast, it is
possible to detect known malware in real time, as the code is passing
through a company’s system. Of course, malware detection is imperfect.281
Deep packet inspection and other forms of network monitoring typically
work by comparing streams of data against signatures of known malicious
code.282 These systems are only as good as their underlying definitions files.
If there is no signature for a particular type of malware, chances are it will
not be detected. As a result, sophisticated “zero-day” attacks—so called
because they occur before the first day on which security personnel become
aware of them and begin to develop countermeasures—may well go
unnoticed.283 Former CIA director Jim Woolsey emphasizes that “[i]f you
can’t deal with a zero-day attack coming from a thumb drive . . . you have
nothing.”284 Of course, these are the very sorts of attacks likely to be
launched by sophisticated adversaries like foreign intelligence services.
Public health law’s biosurveillance framework thus is probably better at
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detecting intrusions of low to modest complexity than those undertaken by
foreign governments.
Second, cyber-threat monitoring has the potential to raise fewer
privacy concerns than biosurveillance.285 Health care providers often give
authorities sensitive information about individual patients, such as their
names, Social Security numbers, and other personally identifiable
information, as well as the diseases they have contracted.286 A properly
designed cyber-monitoring system need not compile and disseminate
information of the same sensitivity. Collection and sharing could be limited
to information about the incidence and prevalence of known malware. The
fact that the “ILoveYou” worm has infected a particular system exposes a
great deal less personal information, and thus raises weaker privacy
concerns, than the fact that a particular patient suffers from HIV or breast
cancer.
The challenge, then, is to provide firms with incentives to collect and
disseminate cyber-security information.287 At present companies have
strong disincentives to do so, partly due to fears of legal liability,288 but also
because of concerns about compromising trade secrets, losing customer
goodwill, and reputational harms.289 Public health law facilitates collection
and sharing through both direct regulation, such as state statutes requiring
health care providers to notify authorities about patients who have
contracted various infectious diseases, and less coercive alternatives.290 A
similar arrangement might be adopted for cyberspace. The government
could require firms to gather information about the vulnerabilities in their
systems, the types of attacks they have suffered, and the countermeasures
they have used to combat malware, and then to disseminate the data to
designated recipients.291 Imposing such an obligation would not eliminate
companies’ incentives to withhold cyber-security data. It would simply
make it more costly for them to do so, where costs include the sanctions for
hoarding discounted by the probability of punishment. Firms will be more
likely to collect and share cyber-security data, but some will still find it
advantageous to hoard.
There is also a less coercive, and probably more effective, alternative.
Cyber-security data is a sort of public good, and economic theory predicts
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that it will be underproduced.292 Firms might be offered subsidies to
encourage them to compile and exchange the needed information.293 These
bounties could be direct payments from the government, tax credits, or
deductions. They could also take the form of enhanced intellectual property
protections for the cyber-security information firms generate. If the
subsidies are large enough, firms will have an incentive not just to report
the data they have already compiled, but to invest in discovering previously
unknown vulnerabilities, threats, and countermeasures.294
Antitrust law can also help recalibrate firms’ incentives.295 Antitrust is
often skeptical of information sharing and other forms of cooperation
among competitors.296 But exchanges of cyber-security data can enhance
consumer welfare by preventing attacks from taking place or at least
mitigating their effects.297 One way to incentivize companies to cooperate is
to alleviate their apparently widespread fears of antitrust liability through
judicial, administrative, or legislative action. Federal courts could expressly
discard the per se approach and substitute a rule of reason when reviewing
private sector agreements to share cyber-security data or to adopt common
security protocols. Instead, arrangements would be judged on a case-bycase basis, and would stand or fall based on the degree to which they
actually advance or hinder consumer welfare. This would reduce the risk of
false positives—the danger that the coarse-grained per se rule might
invalidate a cyber-security initiative that is actually welfare-enhancing.
While this approach shows promise, it also carries some significant
drawbacks. A judicial response may not sufficiently remove legal
uncertainty. Companies will not always be able to predict whether
reviewing courts will sustain or invalidate a proposed cyber-security
venture, and the risk of liability will dissuade firms from forming them.298
In short, the uncertain prospects of ex post judicial approval may not
provide firms with enough assurance ex ante.
A more promising approach would be for administrative agencies to
sponsor cyber-security exchanges, as some in Congress have proposed.299
Agencies with special expertise in cyber-security (such as the NSA and the
Department of Homeland Security) could partner with the agencies that are
292
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responsible for enforcing federal antitrust laws (the Federal Trade
Commission and the Justice Department’s antitrust division) to establish
fora in which companies could establish common security standards and
exchange information. The government’s participation in these fora would
offer assurances that they are being used for legitimate purposes and not as
vehicles for anticompetitive conduct. From the standpoint of participating
firms, this approach is advantageous because it offers them de facto
antitrust immunity.300 It is unlikely that an agency such as the FTC or DOJ
that sponsored a cooperative cyber-security arrangement later would go to
court to have it invalidated. And while the blessing of these agencies does
not formally bind other potential plaintiffs, such as state attorneys general
or private parties, their determination that a proposed venture is permissible
under federal antitrust laws probably would receive a healthy dose of
judicial deference. Government sponsorship has another advantage: it can
help solve the coordination and free-rider problems associated with
collective action.301 A regulator can mitigate these tendencies by coercing
firms into participating in the forum and complying with its requirements;
it also can withhold the forum’s benefits from firms that shirk.
A third alternative would be for Congress to enact a cyber-security
exception to the antitrust laws.302 The upside of a legislative carve-out is
that it would eliminate virtually all risk of liability and thus remove one
powerful disincentive for companies to cooperate on cyber-security
initiatives. Ideally, such a measure would be narrowly tailored to the
precise sort of interfirm cooperation that is desired—the exchange of
vulnerability, threat, and countermeasure information and the development
of common security protocols. In other words, the exemption would be
pegged to specific conduct, and would not immunize entire industries (as
used to be the case with major league baseball303). A broader exception
would offer few additional cyber-security gains and could open the door to
anticompetitive conduct.
We also might consult products liability law for ideas on how to
incentivize companies to exchange cyber-security data. Firms do not have
strong incentives to search for vulnerabilities in their systems or products,
and ISPs are reluctant to monitor network traffic for malicious code.304
Lawmakers might use a combination of carrots and sticks to recalibrate
these incentives. Offers of immunity would increase companies’ expected
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benefits of compiling and sharing cyber-security data; threats of liability
would increase their expected costs of failing to do so.305
Consider the carrots first. Firms could be offered immunity from
various laws that presently inhibit them from collecting and exchanging
certain information about cyber-vulnerabilities and threats. In particular,
Congress could expand the service-provider exception to the Federal
Wiretap Act’s general ban on intercepting electronic communications.306
And the exception could be broadened to authorize ISPs to monitor
network traffic for malicious code that threatens their subscribers’ systems,
not just their own. Congress could also authorize ISPs to notify customers
whose systems are found to be infected by malware.307 It further could
expressly preempt any state laws to the contrary. This would foreclose any
claims that monitoring for malware violates state privacy law or breaches
the terms of service between an ISP and its subscribers. In all cases,
eligibility for these forms of immunity could be conditioned on information
sharing: a company would not be able to take advantage of the safe harbor
unless it shared the information it discovered with other firms. The result
would be to foster strong incentives to exchange data about threats and
vulnerabilities.
As for the sticks, below I propose modifying tort law’s traditional
economic loss doctrine in the cyber-security context.308 Firms that
implement approved security standards would enjoy immunity from
lawsuits seeking redress for injuries sustained from an intrusion; companies
that disregard the protocols would be subject to lawsuits for any resulting
damages. Under such a scheme, a company that implemented the standards
might have its immunity stripped if it failed to share information about
known weaknesses in its systems or products. As for firms that fail to adopt
the security standards, the lack of information sharing could be treated as
an aggravating factor; extra damages could be imposed on firms that are
aware of vulnerabilities or threats but fail to share that information with
other companies. This series of tiered penalties would produce marginal
deterrence; firms would have good reason not only to implement the
approved security standards, but also to exchange the threat and
vulnerability information on which those protocols depend.
B. Hardening Targets
A second objective for a cyber-security regime is to harden critical
systems against attack by developing effective security protocols.309 The
305
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goal of such measures is to prevent cyber-intruders from harming these
systems at all, as opposed to limiting the amount of damage intrusions can
do; the objective is to increase impregnability as opposed to their
survivability.310 Of course, some cyber-attacks inevitably will succeed, so
enhancing survivability, as discussed below,311 is an essential goal as well.
The regulatory disciplines surveyed above suggest various techniques for
encouraging companies to adequately secure their networks. Environmental
law suggests the need for industry-wide security standards; these rules
should be developed through collaborative partnerships between regulatory
agencies and private firms, rather than imposed via direct regulation.
Products liability law suggests that pairing threats of liability with offers of
immunity can incentivize firms to implement the security standards. And
public health law’s use of mandatory vaccinations might be adapted by
incentivizing firms to take certain minimum steps to secure their systems.
Again, different firms and industries face different vulnerabilities, threats,
and consequences, so the resulting security standards should be calibrated
to the particular conditions in individual industries.
Regulators could improve critical systems’ defenses by establishing
and enforcing new cyber-security protocols akin to the environmental
regulations that restrict, say, the amount of sulfur dioxide a given source
may emit into the atmosphere.312 Regulatory standards can help manage the
negative externalities that result when a company suffers a cyber-intrusion.
It should be emphasized at the outset that the specific content of any cybersecurity standards is well beyond the scope of this Article.313 My focus here
310
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subject matter like cyber-security; relying on litigation thus runs the risk that firms will not know what
is expected of them. There is, of course, an important role for litigation—the prospect of civil liability
creates incentives for firms to comply with the regulatory standards. See infra notes 339–51 and
accompanying text. But litigation should be limited to enforcing the standards, not formulating them in
the first place.
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note 2, at 94–95, requiring companies that operate certain sensitive systems to authenticate users before
granting them access, Nojeim, supra note 14, at 131–33; Sklerov, supra note 19, at 22–24, and
disconnecting vulnerable SCADA systems from the Internet, see CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 1, at
167–69; MCAFEE, supra note 37, at 34. Others have debated even more dramatic proposals, such as
requiring ISPs to monitor the traffic that flows over their networks for malicious code, Katyal, Criminal
Law, supra note 10, at 1007, 1095–101; Lichtman & Posner, supra note 61, at 222; Taipale, supra note
311

1553

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

is not on the technical feasibility or policy advantages of any particular
defensive measure. Instead, the focus of this Article is establishing
regulatory mechanisms by which new cyber-security standards—whatever
their content—may be adopted.
Turning to that question, one obvious option would be for
administrative agencies to use traditional “command and control”
regulation—to issue a set of mandatory standards and incentivize firms to
comply with them by threatening civil or criminal penalties.314 This is a
fairly common approach in environmental law,315 and some scholars have
urged the government to adopt it here. Neal Katyal argues that “direct
government regulation” of cyber-security “is the best solution,” and calls
for regulatory agencies to issue “the equivalent of building codes to require
proper design and performance standards for software.”316 Likewise, a
prominent think tank argues that “the federal government bears primary
responsibility” for cyber-security and that “it is completely inadequate” to
leave the matter “to the private sector and the market.”317 Some have even
called for the federal government to take over certain sectors of the
economy in the name of cyber-security. According to an ABA task force,
“government may also need to ‘semi-nationalize’ some sectors (like the
electricity grid) where isolation is not an option and the adverse
consequences of certain low probability events are likely to be very
high.”318 It isn’t steel mills, but Harry Truman would have admired the
proposal.319
Traditional command-and-control regulation seems ill suited to the
task of securing the nation’s cyber-infrastructure. The better course would
be to involve the firms that operate these assets in establishing and
implementing new security protocols. Private sector participation—an
approach sometimes seen in environmental law—is desirable for several
familiar reasons. First, information asymmetries: companies often know
more than regulators about the vulnerabilities in their systems, the types of
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intrusions they have faced, and the most effective countermeasures for
dealing with those threats.320 Second, a related concern is that regulators
probably lack the knowledge necessary to determine the socially optimal
level of cyber-breaches and set the security standards accordingly.321 The
market, through the price system, is capable of aggregating and processing
this information in a way that central planners cannot. Third, rapid
technological change makes it difficult for regulators to formulate durable
security rules.322 Vulnerabilities, threats, and countermeasures are in a
constant state of flux, and regulatory standards cannot keep pace with these
developments. Notice-and-comment rulemaking rarely takes less than two
years, sometimes much longer,323 and the rules likely would be obsolete
before the ink in the Federal Register was dry. Fourth, there is a risk that
government protocols will stifle innovation.324 If regulatory agencies
promulgate a set of mandatory standards, regulated firms will have less
reason to search for newer and more efficient countermeasures; they will
simply implement the government’s directives.
What specific role should private firms have in developing and
implementing cyber-security standards? At least two possibilities come to
mind. First, regulators could practice a form of “delegated regulation”325 in
which they mandate broad security goals and establish the penalties for
falling short, then leave it up to companies to achieve those goals in
whatever manner they deem most effective.326 Regulation by delegation is
said to be appropriate where administrative agencies have the capacity to
“identify specific outcomes but cannot easily codify in generally-applicable
rules the means for achieving them.”327 Environmental law sometimes
follows this approach, as do other fields such as food safety328 and
320
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securities regulation.329 For instance, the EPA’s acid rain program affords
companies a measure of discretion in deciding how to comply with their
obligation under the Clean Air Act to reduce various emissions. And the
EPA’s “bubble” approach to the Clean Air Act allowed polluters to offset
increased emissions from one source with decreased emissions from other
sources, providing them with an incentive to experiment with new
technologies that could reduce emissions at lower cost.330 (Note that both
programs involve discretion in implementing numerical values rather than,
as would be true in the cyber context, substantive standards.) Delegated
regulation seems a good fit for cyber-security, though not a perfect one.
Giving companies discretion to implement the government’s security
standards achieves three of the four benefits of private action mentioned
above: it avoids some problems with information asymmetries, allows for
flexibility in reacting to fast-changing technologies, and promotes rather
than stifles private sector innovation. However, difficulties would remain
with formulating the standards. Regulators probably lack the knowledge
needed to determine the socially optimal level of cyber-breaches and set the
security standards accordingly.
An alternative would be a form of “enforced self-regulation”331 in
which private companies develop new cyber-security protocols in tandem
with the government.332 These requirements would not be handed down by
administrative agencies, but rather would be developed through a
collaborative partnership in which both regulators and regulated would play
a role. In particular, firms might prepare sets of industry-wide security
standards. The National Industrial Recovery Act, famously invalidated by
the Supreme Court in 1935 on nondelegation grounds, contained such a
mechanism,333 and today the energy sector develops reliability standards in
the same way.334 Or agencies could sponsor something like a negotiated
rulemaking in which regulators, firms, and other stakeholders forge a
consensus on new security protocols.335 In either case, agencies would then
ensure compliance through standard administrative techniques like audits,
investigations, and enforcement actions.336 This approach would achieve all
four of the benefits of private action mentioned above: it avoids some
329
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problems with information asymmetries, takes advantage of distributed
private sector knowledge about vulnerabilities and threats, accommodates
rapid technological change, and promotes innovation. On the other hand,
allowing firms to help set the standards that will be enforced against them
may increase the risk of regulatory capture—the danger that agencies will
come to promote the interests of the companies they regulate instead of the
public’s interests.337 The risk of capture is always present in regulatory
action, but it is probably even more acute when regulated entities are
expressly invited to the decisionmaking table.338
Products liability law likewise offers several strategies for hardening
critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks. The prospect that a company
might be required to pay money damages to those who have been injured
by an attack on their systems or products would internalize costs that are
now externalized onto others. Liability thus would incentivize firms to
offer goods (such as computer software) and services (such as online
banking) that are more secure.339 Thanks to the economic loss doctrine,
companies presently face little risk of liability for the injuries that result
from their failure to prevent cyber-intrusions.340 Modifying this default rule
of de facto immunity could help foster incentives for firms to improve their
cyber-defenses.
What could a recalibrated liability regime for cyber-security look like?
Again, a combination of carrots and sticks could be used. Congress might
abolish the economic loss doctrine for injuries that result from a given
company’s wrongful failure to prevent a cyber-attack. In its place,
lawmakers could substitute a regime that imposes liability or offers
immunity based on what steps a company has taken to secure its products
or systems. As for the carrots, firms that implement the security standards
that are developed in tandem with regulators, but nevertheless suffer cyber337
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attacks, could be offered immunity from lawsuits seeking redress for the
resulting damages.341 This cyber “safe harbor” could extend not just to
purely economic injuries (for which firms currently enjoy de facto
immunity) but also to physical injuries and the associated economic harms
(for which firms presently may be held liable). The scope of immunity thus
would be broader than under current law, but it would only be available to
companies that take the desired steps to improve their cyber-defenses.
Lawmakers might use the Safety Act as a model.342 The Support AntiTerrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 grants
immunity to firms that sell certain antiterrorism goods and services, so long
as they comply with various standards, including a requirement that they
carry liability insurance.343
As for the sticks, firms that fail to implement the agreed security
measures and then suffer cyber-attacks could be held liable for the full
range of injuries that result from the intrusions. The severity of the
damages could be pegged to the severity of their misconduct, thereby
achieving marginal deterrence. A company that fails to adopt the approved
security standards might be made to pay compensatory damages or even a
smaller fixed sum set by statute, but a company whose conduct is more
egregious—one that fails to share information about known vulnerabilities
or threats, for instance—might be eligible for exemplary damages. For
inspiration, lawmakers might look to the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, which
imposes liability on banks that fail to protect consumer data,344 contributing
to the financial services sector’s relatively robust defenses against cyberintrusions.345 Such a liability regime would increase both a firm’s expected
benefits of implementing the security protocols, as well as the expected
costs of defying them.
Civil liability would also help promote a more robust market for
cyber-security insurance. Insurers can have a profound effect on the steps
firms take to secure their systems and products against cyber-intrusions,
because they can insist that companies implement various security
measures as a condition of coverage or charge higher premiums to those
that do not.346 Insurance companies provide a sort of second-order
regulation, enforcing cyber-security standards by refusing to bear the losses
of firms with poor records or engaging in price discrimination against
them. The result is to provide the insured with financial incentives to
implement the defenses their insurers are calling for. These incentives have
341
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already borne fruit. According to Bruce Schneier, “[f]irewalls are
ubiquitous because auditors started demanding firewalls. This changed the
cost equation for businesses. The cost of adding a firewall was expense and
user annoyance, but the cost of not having a firewall was failing an
audit.”347 Enforcement by insurers also can decrease the government’s
enforcement costs; there is less need for regulators to verify that firms are
complying with the agreed security standards if insurers, pursuing their
own financial interests, are already doing so.
At present, the market for cyber-security insurance is fairly
underdeveloped (though some insurance companies have begun to offer
coverage348), in part because firms currently face very little risk of liability
for injuries resulting from cyber-attacks on their systems or products; why
insure when one is effectively immune?349 The prospect of civil liability is a
critical first step in creating a viable market for cyber-security insurance.350
Lawmakers might further stimulate the market by offering various kinds of
subsidies. For instance, the government might provide insurers with more
information (including, perhaps, classified information) about the
incidence, prevalence, and consequences of various sorts of malicious
code. Insurers could use this data to more accurately assess the probability
of cyber-intrusions and their potential costs, which would help in setting
premiums.351 Or the government might offer tax benefits to insurers that
offer cyber-security policies. Or it might require certain companies, such as
strategically important firms like public utilities or companies that supply
goods or services to the government, to carry cyber-security insurance.
Public health law suggests a final approach to hardening critical
infrastructure. Most states have enacted laws requiring schoolchildren to be
vaccinated against various diseases,352 and lawmakers might adopt similar
measures for cyberspace. In both contexts, compulsory inoculation helps
reduce negative externalities and foster positive ones. Just as an
unvaccinated child might infect classmates with a pathogen, a computer
system that lacks effective cyber-defenses might be commandeered into a
botnet. In addition, a child who has been vaccinated contributes to herd
immunity and thereby decreases the probability that other, unvaccinated
students will contract the disease. In the same way, companies that adopt

347

Schneier, supra note 35, at 1.
Coyne & Leeson, supra note 14, at 491; Yang & Hoffstadt, supra note 15, at 208–09.
349
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 18; BRENNER, supra note 1, at 225. Another challenge is that it is
difficult for insurers to write policies when—as is often the case with cyber-attacks—the probability
and consequences of an incident are uncertain. See, e.g., Michelle Boardman, Known Unknowns: The
Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 784 (2005) (arguing that insurance coverage for
international terrorism is not possible without adequate actuarial data to calculate risk levels).
350
Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 23.
351
Coyne & Leeson, supra note 14, at 491–92; Frye, supra note 153, at 366–67.
352
See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
348

1559

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

effective cyber-defenses make it less likely that their systems will be used
to transmit malware to other users.
What would mandatory vaccination look like in cyberspace? Several
variants exist. The most coercive approaches involve direct regulation, akin
to a requirement that all citizens receive a particular vaccine. One option
would be for lawmakers to mandate that every computer user (or, less
dramatically, firms in particularly sensitive industries such as the
telecommunications sector) install certain security products on their
systems, such as antivirus software or firewalls. Think of it as a digital
equivalent of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s “individual
mandate” to purchase health insurance.353 An alternative would be for the
government to require ISPs to provide their customers with a specified
security software package.354 ISPs presumably would pass on the costs of
the software to their subscribers, so the effect would be the same as the
individual mandate approach—users would be made to pay a premium for
a security product they previously declined to purchase. Or, the
government could compensate the ISPs for the costs of making the security
package available to their subscribers. In that event, the scheme would
represent a (likely regressive) wealth transfer from taxpayers who do not
use computers to those who do.
Another less coercive set of options would withhold or offer certain
benefits to incentivize security improvements; they are the equivalent of
making vaccination a condition of eligibility to attend public schools. The
ability to access the Internet, as opposed to local or proprietary networks, is
a valuable benefit of the service one receives from an ISP—for many
subscribers it is the most valuable benefit ISPs offer—and it might be
conditioned on a subscriber taking steps to improve cyber-security. In
particular, regulators could direct ISPs to refuse to route users’ traffic to the
public Internet unless they are able to verify that the users have installed
specified security software on their systems.355 Alternatively, government
web sites could refuse any traffic sent from a system that has not adopted
specified security measures. Users thus would be unable to, for example,
post comments in an online rulemaking docket or check the status of a tax
refund unless they adopted the security measures. This sort of measure
depends on the ability to authenticate the identity of the sender, as well as
the presence of various cyber-defenses on its system. That capability does
not presently exist, because the TCP/IP routing protocol is unconcerned
with the sender’s identity,356 though some scholars believe an authenticated
Internet is inevitable.357 Finally, the government could offer tax credits or
353
354
355
356
357
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deductions to firms or individual users that install the specified security
software on their systems—another (likely regressive) wealth transfer.
C. Survivability and Recovery
The third thing an ideal cyber-security regime would do is promote
resilience, thus limiting the amount of damage attackers can do to critical
infrastructure. Here, the goals are survivability and recovery, not
impregnability.358 As Derek Bambauer emphasizes, “[m]itigation, not
prevention, is the key.”359 The need to build resilience into the nation’s
cyber-defenses is a concession to reality; no matter how good one’s
defenses are, some attackers will be able to breach them. As a result, it is
not enough to try to prevent attacks altogether. It is also necessary to
minimize the amount of harm that the inevitably successful intrusions can
do, and to restore victims to the status quo ante as quickly as possible.
Public health law offers several strategies for improving resilience. In
realspace, quarantine and isolation aim at minimizing the harm a pathogen
can do; once an outbreak is underway, we want to contain the disease and
limit the number of people to whom it can spread. Quarantine and isolation
might be adapted for cyberspace—where the goal is to prevent malicious
code from infecting more machines—in any number of ways. The most
straightforward approach would be for authorities, in the event of a cyberattack, to order systems that are known or suspected to be infected with
malware to temporarily disconnect from the Internet. While in quarantine,
the systems could be inspected to see if they are in fact carrying malicious
code. If not, they could be reconnected; if so, they could be repaired. The
analogy to public health law is fairly exact: separation of the infected,
whether physical or virtual, prevents them from spreading the contagion to
others and presents an opportunity for treatment. While potentially
effective, this approach has a significant drawback—legitimate users will
be unable to access the infected system while it is offline. Putting a bank
into cyber-quarantine does not just keep hackers from stealing money, it
also keeps a customer from logging on to pay a credit card bill. A less
drastic way of preventing the spread of malware would be to isolate traffic
rather than systems. Infected systems would remain connected to the
Internet, but authorities could use or require firms to use deep packet
inspection to determine if the data the systems are sending and receiving
contain malware. If a given packet is found to be carrying malicious code,
it could be blocked; if not, it would be allowed to continue on its way. The
public health analogy is allowing a man infected with SARS to leave an
isolation facility and go about his business while wearing a surgical mask
that intercepts the respiratory droplets through which the virus is spread.
The virtue of this finer-grained variant is that it allows legitimate users to
358
359
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continue to access an infected system even as attackers are prevented from
using it for their malign purposes; the hackers are thwarted, but customers
can still access their accounts, although perhaps a bit more slowly than
usual. On the other hand, traffic quarantines will only be as effective as the
packet sniffers and malware signature files on which they rely, and
sophisticated adversaries might be able to defeat both.
Another more controversial set of options involves preventive
quarantine—separating systems that have not been infected but that are
vulnerable. This approach would turn public health law on its head: rather
than isolating the sick, authorities would isolate the healthy. The most
aggressive variant would require a select group of strategically significant
firms, such as the power grid, financial institutions, and
telecommunications carriers, to temporarily disconnect from the Internet if
a cyber-attack takes place.360 Senator Nelson Rockefeller introduced
legislation along these lines in 2009,361 but critics denounced it as an
“Internet Kill Switch.”362 Preventive quarantine would be a fairly effective
way of preventing malware from spreading to critical infrastructure
because a system that isn’t on the Internet can’t contract a virus that
spreads online. But it wouldn’t be infallible. Even “air gapped” systems—
those that are physically separated from the Internet363—are vulnerable to
infection via USB devices and other removable media.364 A disconnection
requirement could also prove quite costly: the affected systems would be
unavailable to legitimate users for as long as the order remained in effect.
There is also a risk that regulators might pull the disconnection trigger too
readily. As an alternative to a strict disconnection requirement, regulators
might direct strategically significant firms to implement security
countermeasures of their own devising in the event of a cyber-attack.
Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced legislation along these lines in
2010,365 and it likewise was denounced as a kill switch.366 Whatever the
content of these security protocols—encrypting data to prevent its theft, for
360
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instance, or requiring users to authenticate themselves before gaining
access to the system—they could be established through the collaborative
regulatory partnership described above.367 An even more modest version of
preventive quarantine would be, as above, to segregate traffic rather than
entire systems. In the event of a cyber-attack, packet sniffers might be used
to inspect all traffic that is sent to and from designated systems. This would
allow the systems to continue to operate more or less as usual, though
perhaps at a cost of less security.
Another important goal is to ensure that critical systems are able to
continue functioning during a cyber-attack and recover quickly thereafter.
One way to achieve this is to build systems with excess capacity—to
include more capabilities than a firm needs for its day-to-day operations,
which can be held in reserve and called into service if an attack takes
place.368 In particular, regulators might require certain companies to build
their systems with excess bandwidth. A “strategic reserve of bandwidth” is
an especially useful countermeasure for defending against denial-of-service
attacks;369 if a company’s servers are being overwhelmed, the reserve
bandwidth can be brought into service to process the requests. Regulators
also might require certain companies to maintain redundant data storage
capabilities. These firms might routinely back up their data to servers that
are dispersed both geographically and in network terms. If a cyber-attack
corrupted their systems, it would be relatively easy to wipe them clean and
restore the data from an uncorrupted backup.370 An attacker thus might
succeed in taking down one site “only to find that the same content
continues to appear through other servers. This is like playing electronic
Whac-A-Mole on a global scale . . . .”371 These sorts of measures are akin to
the public health practice of stockpiling medicines and vaccines for use in a
crisis. The CDC may not need 300 million doses of smallpox vaccine in its
everyday operations, but they would prove critical in the event of an
outbreak.
Excess capacity can be expensive; requiring firms to keep reserves of
largely unused bandwidth costs money, and “[h]aving information located
in multiple places makes it more costly to maintain.”372 One way to pay for
these measures would be for companies to pass their costs of complying
with resilience mandates to their customers in the form of price increases,
service decreases, or both. A difficulty with this approach is that improving
a given company’s ability to withstand an attack does not just confer
benefits on its customers. It also confers benefits on third parties; if
367
368
369
370
371
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Citibank can continue to operate notwithstanding a DDOS, its customers
will still be able to pay their bills, and third-party vendors will still be able
to receive payments. Excess capacity thus creates positive externalities, and
the customers who pay higher prices for excess capacity are effectively
subsidizing others. Another option would be for the government to offer
various subsidies to firms that are subject to survivability mandates. This
approach is based on a recognition that excess capacity is, in a sense, a
public good that the market will tend to undersupply.373 In part because
excess capacity requirements can be costly, regulators would only apply
them to selected firms of special strategic significance.
D. Responding to Cyber-attacks
The fourth and final component of an effective cyber-security regime
is responding to individuals, groups, and states that have committed cyberattacks. This topic naturally lends itself to analysis under the law
enforcement and armed conflict frameworks, and it is exhaustively covered
in the existing literature.374 For instance, scholars have proposed better
international cooperation on cyber-crime investigations, increasing the
penalties for certain computer-related offenses, increasing the costs that
perpetrators must bear to commit cyber-crimes, treating intrusions as
“armed attacks” that trigger the right to self-defense under the United
Nations Charter, treating cyber-attacks as acts of aggression that justify
retaliating with conventional military force, and so on.375 This Article does
not seek to add to this already voluminous literature. There is, however,
one type of response that deserves brief mention: active self-defense, or
“hackbacks.”
A hackback is an in-kind response to a cyber-attack. The victim
essentially mounts a counterattack against the assailant, “shutting down the
attack before it can do further harm and/or damaging the perpetrator’s
system to stop it from launching future attacks.”376 This might be
accomplished in several ways. If a victim detects that it is experiencing a
cyber-attack, it might direct a flood of traffic to the servers through which
the attack is being routed, temporarily overwhelming them and preventing
them from continuing the intrusion.377 Or it might hack into the responsible
servers, taking control of them or damaging them.378 Some scholars believe
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that hackbacks are the most effective defense against cyber-attacks,379 in
part because active self-defense can avoid the attribution problem; a victim
firm that is experiencing an intrusion could retaliate against any computer
that is attacking it without knowing who is behind the incident or his
purposes.380 Needless to say, active self-defense is only possible if the
victim is aware that it is under attack. It will not be an option if, as is
sometimes the case, the intrusion goes undetected.
Active self-defense fits into the law enforcement framework fairly
comfortably. Although hackbacks are probably illegal under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act381—the victims are, after all, perpetrating cyberintrusions of their own—fundamental principles of criminal law can
explain why they might be acceptable if we were writing on a blank slate.
The basic idea is justification. Conduct that ordinarily is condemned can
become permissible, or even desirable, in certain circumstances.382
Homicide is typically illegal, but we are allowed to use deadly force against
those who pose a threat to our lives or the lives of others. The same might
be said of hackbacks. Society ordinarily condemns those who break into
others’ computers, but one might be justified in hacking a machine to
frustrate its attack on one’s own system.383
Active self-defense is controversial, but it offers one potential benefit
that has been largely overlooked in the literature. Like the other regulatory
solutions discussed in this Article, hackbacks can incentivize firms to
improve the security of their systems. Cyber-perpetrators typically do not
launch attacks directly; to obscure their responsibility, they usually route an
attack through a chain of unsecured intermediary systems before reaching
the ultimate target.384 If a victim responds to an intrusion with active self-
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defense, it is likely that these third-party systems will be harmed.385 The
realspace analog is a driver who leaves his car unlocked with the keys in
the ignition; the car is then stolen by bank robbers and destroyed when the
thieves open fire and the bank’s security guards shoot back. Many scholars
regard this third-party problem as a sufficient reason to forbid hackbacks.386
Yet the prospect of damage to third parties may have beneficial effects. The
threat of harm would incentivize third parties to prevent their systems from
being used as conduits for attacks on others. Suppose Citibank knows that,
if attackers gain control of its computers and use them to conduct DDOS
attacks, the victims will be allowed to retaliate against Citibank’s
machines. Citibank will have a fairly strong incentive to ensure that its
computers are not commandeered into botnets. Damage from hackbacks
thus would internalize some of the costs that third parties impose on others
by maintaining insecure systems.387 (Likewise in realspace. If drivers know
that security guards are allowed to damage getaway cars even if they are
stolen, they will lock their doors.) Active self-defense also might weaken
attackers’ incentives to commit cyber-attacks. If assailants know that
victims will be able to use hackbacks to render their attacks ineffective, or
less effective, they will have less reason to undertake them in the first
place. By increasing the futility of intrusions, hackbacks can help achieve
deterrence.388 Active self-defense thus can simultaneously foster favorable
incentives to improve security and weaken unfavorable incentives to
commit attacks.
At the same time, active self-defense has a number of glaring
downsides. It seems inequitable to force third parties whose systems have
been compromised to bear the costs of the ensuing hackbacks—especially
if they are individual users rather than sophisticated firms capable of
devoting meaningful sums to cyber-defense.389 Moreover, as Orin Kerr
points out, active self-defense “would create an obvious incentive for
attackers to be extra careful to disguise their location or use someone else’s
computer to launch the attack.”390 Permitting hackbacks also would
385
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“encourage foul play designed to harness the new privileges”; one example
is the “bankshot attack,” in which an assailant who wants a computer to be
attacked “can route attacks through that one computer towards a series of
victims, and then wait for the victims to attack back at that computer.”391 It
cannot be predicted a priori whether the harmful conduct produced by these
negative incentives would be greater or lesser than the beneficial conduct
produced by the positive incentives. A good deal more study is needed
before an active self-defense regime could be put into place.
CONCLUSION
Cyber-threats aren’t going away. As society increasingly comes to rely
on networked critical infrastructure such as banks and the power grid,
adversaries will find that they have ever more to gain by attacking these
digital assets. And we will find that we have ever more to lose.
It therefore becomes essential to think about cyber-security using an
analytical framework that is rich enough to account for the problem in all
its complexity. Cyber-security is too important, and too intricate, to leave
to the criminal law and the law of armed conflict. Instead, as this Article
has proposed, an entirely new conceptual approach is needed—an approach
that can account for the systematic tendency of many private firms to
underinvest in cyber-defense. Companies sometimes fail to secure their
systems against attackers because they do not bear the full costs of the
resulting intrusions; the harms are partially externalized onto third parties.
Firms also tend to neglect cyber-security because by improving their own
defenses they contribute to the security of others’ systems; the benefits are
partially externalized, which creates opportunities for free riding. If these
problems sound familiar, that’s because they are. These challenges of
negative externalities, positive externalities, and free riding are similar to
challenges that the modern administrative state encounters in a number of
other settings, such as environmental law, antitrust law, products liability
law, and public health law. Scholars and lawmakers might look to these
other fields for suggestions on how to incentivize private firms to improve
their defenses; conceiving of cyber-security in regulatory terms opens the
door to regulatory solutions.
Of course, “regulatory solutions” need not mean “command-andcontrol solutions.” Often it will be possible to promote better cyber-security
by appealing to firms’ self-interest—encouraging them to improve their
defenses by immunizing them from liability or offering other subsidies—
instead of sanctioning them when they fail to do so. For instance, rather
than empowering a central regulator to monitor the Internet for outbreaks
of malicious code, companies should use something like public health
law’s distributed biosurveillance network to collect and share information
391
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about cyber-threats. Similarly, the private sector should play an active role
in establishing industry-wide cyber-security standards, as it frequently does
in environmental law and other regulatory contexts. Offers of immunity
and threats of liability then would be used to encourage companies to adopt
the agreed-upon standards. And as for improving the ability of critical
systems to survive intrusions, infected computers could be temporarily
disconnected from the Internet to keep them from spreading the malware,
and companies should be encouraged to build their systems with excess
capacity (such as reserve bandwidth and remote backups) that can be called
into service during cyber-attacks.
Virtually no one is happy with the state of America’s cyber-defenses,
and scholars have felled entire forests exploring how to prosecute cybercriminals more effectively or retaliate against countries that launch cyberattacks. Maybe we’ve been asking the wrong questions. Maybe what we
need to secure cyberspace isn’t cops, spies, or soldiers. Maybe what we
need is administrative law.
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